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Searching Places Unknown:  
Law Enforcement Jurisdiction  
on the Dark Web 
Ahmed Ghappour* 
Abstract. The use of hacking tools by law enforcement to pursue criminal suspects who 
have anonymized their communications on the dark web presents a looming flashpoint 
between criminal procedure and international law. Criminal actors who use the dark web 
(for instance, to commit crimes or to evade authorities) obscure digital footprints left 
behind with third parties, rendering existing surveillance methods obsolete. In response, 
law enforcement has implemented hacking techniques that deploy surveillance software 
over the Internet to directly access and control criminals’ devices. The practical reality of 
the underlying technologies makes it inevitable that foreign-located computers will be 
subject to remote “searches” and “seizures.” The result may well be the greatest 
extraterritorial expansion of enforcement jurisdiction in U.S. law enforcement history.  
This Article examines how the government’s use of hacking tools on the dark web 
profoundly disrupts the legal architecture on which cross-border criminal investigations 
rest. These overseas cyberoperations raise increasingly difficult questions regarding who 
may authorize these activities, where they may be deployed, and against whom they may 
lawfully be executed. The rules of criminal procedure fail to regulate law enforcement 
hacking because they allow these critical decisions to be made by rank-and-file officials 
despite potentially disruptive foreign relations implications. This Article outlines a 
regulatory framework that reallocates decisionmaking to the institutional actors who are 
best suited to determine U.S. foreign policy and avoids sacrificing law enforcement’s 
ability to identify and locate criminal suspects who have taken cover on the dark web. 
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Introduction 
Nestled deep beneath the surface of the World Wide Web, Dread Pirate 
Roberts (DPR) ran an underground empire of criminality. Not much was 
known about DPR, except that he appeared to have built the Silk Road—a 
global online marketplace for illicit services and contraband.1 DPR—later 
identified as Ross Ulbricht—was the target of a global manhunt that operated 
in the dark for nearly three years.2 In that time, the Silk Road attracted over 
100,000 users who transacted over one million deals, generating an estimated 
$1.2 billion in global sales from vendors located in more than ten countries 
around the world.3  
The Silk Road was built to facilitate black market transactions. It was 
hosted on the dark web, a global network of computers that use a cryptograph-
ic protocol to communicate, enabling users to conduct transactions 
anonymously without revealing their location.4 Users could only make 
payments in the digital currency Bitcoin, and transactions were run through a 
“series of dummy transaction[s] to disguise the link between buyers and 
 
 1. MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES: EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED, EVERYONE IS 
VULNERABLE, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 194 (2015); Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s 
Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ross Ulbricht, A/K/A “Dread Pirate 
Roberts,” Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts 
-sentenced-manhattan-federal-court-life-prison. 
 2. The Silk Road website went live in February 2011. See GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 198. 
U.S. agencies commenced a number of independent Silk Road investigations in the fall 
of 2011. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial at 1389, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 
(KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2015) (relating a joint stipulation by the government and 
defense that if called to testify, Special Agent Richardson of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration would testify that she attempted a number of purchases on the Silk 
Road website between September 2011 and May 2013 as part of an undercover 
investigation); Transcript of Trial at 71, 153, Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y.  
Jan. 14, 2015) (indicating via in-court testimony that the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) commenced its investigation in October 2011); Affidavit of Special 
Agent Ilhwan Yum in Support of a Search Warrant at 1, 6, United States v. Certain 
Premises, No. 13-1051-M (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013) (stating that an investigation by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was ongoing as of November 2011). Ulbricht was 
arrested on October 1, 2013. See Affidavit of Special Agent Tigran Gambaryan in 
Support of Criminal Complaint at 11, United States v. Force, No. 3-15-70370 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 25, 2015). The Silk Road was shuttered by the FBI on October 2, 2013. See id. at 10. 
 3. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 1; see also Donna 
Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down Cyber-Underworld Site Silk Road, USA TODAY 
(May 15, 2014, 2:54 PM EDT), http://usat.ly/1b8Gntk (“Beyond illegal drugs, the site 
served as a bazaar for fake passports, driver’s licenses and other documents, as well as 
illegal service providers, such as hit men, forgers and computer hackers.”). 
 4. Leger, supra note 3. To access the Silk Road, users needed specialized anonymity 
software allowing them to communicate on the dark web. Id. 
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sellers.”5 Thousands of drug dealers flocked to the Silk Road because of the 
anonymity it promised;6 there, they conducted over a million drug deals out of 
reach of law enforcement’s most advanced electronic surveillance tools.7 
Investigators made bold efforts to infiltrate the hidden website to identify 
DPR. They posed as buyers and sellers on the site, completing over a hundred 
purchases.8 One agent even infiltrated the staff of the website, spending ten to 
twelve hours per day administering the site and communicating with DPR 
directly.9 All for naught. Their attempts failed because existing surveillance 
methods rely on digital trails left behind with third parties by computers on 
the web—the very information obscured by the dark web. In the end, it was an 
IRS agent who solved the case, stumbling upon communications on a public 
website advertising the Silk Road just before its launch in 2011.10 Because of 
Ulbricht’s own human error, the communication was traced back to him,11 and 
the alleged kingpin was apprehended, prosecuted, and sentenced to life in 
prison.12 
Several underground marketplaces surfaced in the wake of the Silk Road,13 
highlighting an asymmetry between investigators’ ability to track unlawful 
activity and criminals’ capacity to commit crimes on the dark web.14 The 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Transcript of Trial at 42, Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015) 
(“Thousands of drug dealers flocked to Silk Road, and more than 1 million drug deals 
took place on the site before the government shut it down.”). 
 7. See id.; Leslie R. Caldwell, Ensuring Tech-Savvy Criminals Do Not Have Immunity from 
Investigation, U.S. DEP’T JUST. BLOGS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/blog/ensuring-tech-savvy-criminals-do-not-have-immunity-investigation (“[T]he 
abuse of internet anonymizing technology . . . [is] the digital equivalent of crimes 
committed in the middle of a busy street, in full view of the citizenry and the police, 
with little risk of being caught.” (italics omitted)). 
 8. See GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 196. 
 9. See Andy Greenberg, Undercover Agent Reveals How He Helped the FBI Trap Silk Road’s 
Ross Ulbricht, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/silk 
-road-trial-undercover-dhs-fbi-trap-ross-ulbricht. 
 10. See Nathaniel Popper, The Tax Sleuth Who Took Down a Drug Lord, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 25, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1R02DMZ. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Transcript of Sentencing at 94, Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015). 
In the interest of disclosure, the Author advised on Ulbricht’s appeal. 
 13. See, e.g., Steven Nelson, Buying Drugs Online Remains Easy, 2 Years After FBI Killed Silk 
Road, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 2, 2015, 3:12 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2015/10/02/buying-drugs-online-remains-easy-2-years-after-fbi-killed 
-silk-road; Benjamin Weiser, Man Charged with Operating Silk Road 2.0, a Black Market 
Website, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1slvgVH. 
 14. For example, Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.), then-Chairman of the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, stated at the time of the launch of Silk 
Road 2.0: “This new website—launched barely a month after Federal agents shut down 
footnote continued on next page 
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existence of hidden services like the Silk Road “dramatically lower[s] the entry 
barriers into the underground economy—for both buyers and sellers” of illicit 
goods and services.15 The use of the dark web by criminal actors therefore 
enables secret, untraceable criminal activity to take place at scale. This has led 
policymakers to question whether law enforcement has sufficient tools to 
counter the illicit conduct that might flow through the digital underworld.16  
The term “network investigative technique” is a euphemism for law 
enforcement hacking; it describes a law enforcement surveillance method that 
entails remotely accessing and installing malware on a computer without the 
permission of its owner or operator.17 Network investigative techniques are 
especially useful in the pursuit of criminal suspects who use anonymizing 
software to obscure their location. By accessing the target computer directly 
and converting it into a surveillance device, use of network investigative 
techniques circumvents the need to know a target’s location and makes the 
 
the original Silk Road—underscores the inescapable reality that technology is dynamic 
and ever-evolving and that government policy needs to adapt accordingly.” Press 
Release, Sen. Tom Carper, Chairman, Senate Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs 
Comm., Chairman Carper Statement on the Unveiling of the So-Called “Silk Road 2.0” 
Website (Nov. 6 2013), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ 
chairman-carper-statement-on-the-unveiling-of-the-so-called-silk-road-20-website. 
 15. See Government Sentencing Submission at 2, Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2015). 
 16. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Tom Carper, supra note 14.  
 17. This Article uses the terms “network investigative technique,” “cyberexfiltration 
operation,” and “hacking” interchangeably to describe the use of software that subverts 
a computer. In computer science, the common term is “malware” (short for “malicious 
software”). See ROBERT SLADE, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION SECURITY 118 (2006) 
(defining malware as a “collective term including the many varieties of deliberately 
malicious software; that is, software written for the purpose of causing inconvenience, 
destruction, or the breaking of security policies or provisions”). Law enforcement has 
used a wide variety of other terms to refer to hacking, including “Computer and 
Internet Protocol Address Verifier” (CIPAV), “Internet Protocol Address Verifier” 
(IPAV), “Remote Access Search and Surveillance” (RASS), “Remote Computer Search,” 
“Remote Search,” “Computer Tracer,” “Internet Tracer,” “Remote Computer Trace,” 
and “Web Bug.” See, e.g., Application & Affidavit of Special Agent Norman B. Sanders, 
Jr. for Search Warrant at 2-3, In re Search of Any Comput. Accessing Elec. Messages 
Directed to MySpace Account “Timberlinebombinfo,” No. MJ07-5114 (W.D. Wash. 
June 12, 2007) [hereinafter Sanders Affidavit] (using “CIPAV”); see also Elec. Frontier 
Found., FBI CIPAV-8 (n.d.), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi_cipav-08.pdf 
(consisting of a cache of documents released from the FBI to the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation showing usage of the terms “CIPAV,” “IPAV,” “RASS,” and “Web Bug” in 
various FBI correspondences and field office requests for technical assistance from the 
FBI’s Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit); Elec. Frontier Found., FBI CIPAV-10 
(n.d.), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/FBI_CIPAV-10.pdf (consisting of a 
cache of documents released from the FBI to the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
showing usage of these terms in various FBI field office requests for technical assistance 
from the FBI’s Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit). 
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new surveillance method a practical solution for the pursuit of criminal 
suspects on the dark web. Once installed, the right malware can cause a 
computer to perform any task the computer is capable of performing.18 
Malware can force the target computer to covertly upload files to a server 
controlled by law enforcement or instruct the computer’s camera or 
microphone to gather images and sound.19 It can even commandeer computers 
that associate with the target by, for example, accessing a website it hosts.20  
The legal process for the use of network investigative techniques is 
governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which articulates 
procedures for obtaining a search warrant in federal magistrate court. The 
former version of Rule 41 restricted authority to issue search warrants to the 
district of the magistrate making the decision.21 This had caused courts to deny 
search warrants for computers whose locations were unknown because they 
may have been outside the magistrate’s district.22 An amendment to the rule 
laid to rest this administrative hurdle by explicitly permitting magistrates to 
issue a search warrant for a device if the device’s location “has been concealed 
through technological means.”23 The relevant portion of Rule 41(b)(6) reads:  
 
 18. See What Is Malware?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, 
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/documentation/glossary/what-is-malware (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2017) (defining “malware” as “a file or code, typically delivered over a 
network[,] that infects, explores, steals or conducts virtually any behavior an attacker 
wants”); see also Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities 
for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 26-27 (2014) (providing 
a brief technical explanation of how malware can control devices and components of a 
computer by modifying programs known as “device drivers”); Craig Timberg & Ellen 
Nakashima, FBI’s Search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect in Bomb Threats, Highlights Use of Malware for 
Surveillance, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013), https://wpo.st/dooc2 (describing the functional-
ity of various types of malware known to have been used by the FBI). 
 19. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 
753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (rejecting an application for a warrant to deploy malware 
“designed not only to extract certain stored electronic records but also to generate user 
photographs and location information over a 30 day period”); Timberg & Nakashima, 
supra note 18 (describing malware that turns on a computer’s camera); Kim Zetter,  
So . . . Now the Government Wants to Hack Cybercrime Victims, WIRED (May 4, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/now-government-wants-hack-cybercrime 
-victims (describing malware that turns on a computer’s microphone). 
 20. See Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website, and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer, 
WIRED (Aug. 5, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/operation_torpedo. 
 21. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)-(5). Rule 41 provides that a search warrant may be issued by 
“a magistrate judge with authority in the district.” See id. 41(b). 
 22. See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 
757, 761. 
 23. See Letters from Chief Justice John G. Roberts to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. Senate, attachment at 6  
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr16_mj80.pdf 
(submitting amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
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[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to 
a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access 
to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored 
information located within or outside that district if: 
(A) the district where the media or information is located has been concealed 
through technological means . . . .24 
Although the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in recommending the 
amendment to Rule 41, explicitly stated that the amendment is not meant to 
give courts the power to issue warrants that authorize searches in foreign 
countries,25 the practical reality of the underlying technology means overseas 
searches will be both unavoidable and frequent. The result may well be the 
largest expansion of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in FBI history.26 
The legal process for network investigative techniques presumes search 
targets are territorially located, which is not at all accurate. Indeed, most 
potential targets on the dark web are outside the territorial United States.27 
Approximately 80% of the computers on the dark web are located outside the 
United States.28 And because each device’s location is indistinguishable from 
that of the next, any given law enforcement target is likely to be located 
 
 24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (emphasis added). The amendment became effective on 
December 1, 2016. See id. advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment. 
 25. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Judge Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 4 (Sept. 18, 2013), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: APRIL 2014, at 171, 174 (2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR2014-04.pdf. 
 26. See Ahmed Ghappour, Justice Department Proposal Would Massively Expand FBI 
Extraterritorial Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://justsecurity 
.org/15018/justice-department-proposal-massive-expand-fbi-extraterritorial 
-surveillance. 
 27. For example, in the Silk Road case, computer security experts who were following or 
associated with the case opined that it was possible the FBI hacked into Silk Road 
servers, located in Iceland, to extract key evidence used in the prosecution and 
forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, How Did the FBI Find the Silk Road Servers, 
Anyway?, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 3, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/ 
read/how-did-the-fbi-find-the-silk-road-servers-anyway. This issue was raised by the 
defense and denied on standing grounds and is currently on appeal. See Brief for 
Defendant-Appellant at 108, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 15-1815-CR (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 
2016), 2016 WL 158389; see also Andy Greenberg, Fed’s Silk Road Investigation Broke 
Privacy Laws, Defendant Tells Court, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2014, 2:54 PM), https://www.wired 
.com/2014/08/feds-silk-road-investigation-violated-privacy-law-sites-alleged-creator 
-tells-court. More recently, as part of a child pornography investigation the FBI 
infected thousands of computers overseas with malware. See Joseph Cox, FBI Hacked 
Over 8,000 Computers in 120 Countries Based on One Warrant, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 22, 
2016, 6:18 PM EST) [hereinafter Cox, FBI Hack], http://motherboard.vice.com/read/fbi 
-hacked-over-8000-computers-in-120-countries-based-on-one-warrant. 
 28. See Top-10 Countries by Relay Users, TORMETRICS, 
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
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abroad. Thus, the issue is not whether magistrates should be authorized to issue 
search warrants where the target of the search can be in any of the ninety-four 
federal judicial districts in the United States. Instead, the issue is whether (and 
how) investigators should conduct out-of-district searches where targets are 
likely to be located out-of-country as well.  
The extraterritorial aspect of law enforcement hacking operations has 
drawn sharp public criticism by a wide array of commentators, academics, civil 
liberties organizations, and technology corporations.29 Technology giant 
Google warned that the use of network investigative techniques in pursuit of 
targets on the dark web would undermine the sovereignty of nations by 
“authorizing the government to conduct searches outside the United States.”30 
Google and others cautioned that loosening territorial restrictions on the 
government’s search and seizure power “raises a number of monumental and 
highly complex constitutional, legal, and geopolitical concerns.”31 While the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure flagged this concern,32 
noting the potential regulatory gap regarding cross-border searches, it 
explicitly left such “issues that may have foreign policy implications” to be 
dealt with through “inter-executive branch coordination.”33 
Whether law enforcement is permitted to launch cross-border cyberexfil-
tration operations is the latest in a series of questions testing the limits of 
unilateral investigatory activities in a globally networked world. At the core of 
the inquiry is the well-established international law axiom that one state may 
 
 29. The Rule 41 Subcommittee received more than fifty written comments in addition to 
comments that were presented at hearings before the full Advisory Committee in 
November 2014. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC& 
sb=commentDueDate&po=0&D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
Civil liberties groups that submitted public comments included the ACLU, the Center 
for Democracy & Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. See id. 
 30. Letter from Richard Salgado, Dir. of Law Enf’t & Info. Sec., Google Inc., to the Advisory 
Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure 2-3 (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.regulations 
.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0029&attachment 
Number=1&contentType=pdf. 
 31. Id. at 1; see also, e.g., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Written Statement of the Center for 
Democracy & Technology Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 4 (2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES 
-CR-2014-0004-0009 (“Unilateral extraterritorial searches may violate the international 
obligations of the United States.”). 
 32. See Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, to Advisory Comm. 
on Rules of Criminal Procedure 13-14 (Feb. 25, 2015), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
RULES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: MAY 2015, at 87, 99-
100 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR2015-05.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 14-15.  
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not unilaterally exercise its law enforcement functions in the territory of 
another state,34 which has not been adequately addressed by courts or 
scholarship in the context of cyberspace. 
While there is a wealth of scholarship on the relationship between the 
Internet and state sovereignty, its focus has almost exclusively been on the 
permissibility of one state’s laws regulating Internet conduct that takes place in 
another state (exercising “prescriptive jurisdiction”), rather than the 
permissibility of a state effectuating compliance with those laws in the 
territory of another state (exercising “enforcement jurisdiction”).35 Jack 
Goldsmith offers perhaps the most sustained focus on the issue of cross-border 
enforcement jurisdiction. He argues that while multiple nations may in theory 
regulate the same Internet transaction, the system as a whole is stable in part 
because each nation can only enforce regulations within its territory.36 Thus, 
while states may criminalize conduct that occurs wholly outside their 
borders,37 the system as a whole is stable because states do not directly exercise 
law enforcement functions in other countries without first obtaining 
consent.38 
In a similar vein, scholarship interrogating the extraterritorial aspects of 
law enforcement surveillance on the Internet has focused on the extraterritori-
 
 34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their 
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, 
given by duly authorized officials of that state.”).  
 35. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 156-58 (2006); Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 35, 45-47; Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 
1205-13 (1998). 
 36. See Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1220-21 (arguing that the “threat of multiple regulation 
of cyberspace information flows” must be “measured by a regulation’s enforceable 
scope,” which is limited to persons and entities with presence or assets in the territory 
of the regulating state).  
 37. As a matter of domestic law, Congress could in principle extend the reach of the 
criminal law as far as it likes, subject to constitutional limits. See John H. Knox, A 
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 351 (2010). The 
Supreme Court has never clarified whether such limits exist. See id.; cf. Lea Brilmayer & 
Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (arguing that constitutional due process “limits extraterritorial 
application of substantive federal law”).  
 38. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 432(2); ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 3.2.3, at 44 (2d ed. 2010) (defining “enforcement” (or “executive”) 
jurisdiction as “the right to effect legal process coercively, such as to arrest someone, or 
undertake searches and seizures”); see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 
604, 625 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Extraterritorial application [of a criminal statute], in 
other words, does not automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authori-
ty.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  
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al scope of Fourth Amendment rights.39 It lacks a thorough treatment of the 
interstate jurisdictional frictions that result and the implications such conduct 
might have on our conceptions of sovereignty, foreign relations, and Internet 
governance. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the threat of harmful cross-border 
cyberoperations has become ever-present and raises questions about the 
capacity of states to protect their sovereign interests in territorial cyberinfra-
structure.40 There is a scholarly consensus that in theory, a cross-border 
cyberoperation could be characterized as an “internationally wrongful act” 
(permitting a state to respond with countermeasures under customary 
international law), a prohibited “use of force” (authorizing otherwise 
prohibited force in self-defense), or an “armed attack” (entitling harmed states 
to use otherwise prohibited force in self-defense), depending on the scope and 
severity of the damage caused by the operation.41 States also use their domestic 
computer crime laws to criminalize cross-border cyberoperations by both state 
and nonstate actors that have effects in their territory.42  
 
 39. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 380-87 (2015) 
(arguing that Fourth Amendment territoriality is a poor fit for regulating government 
collection of electronic data and discussing alternatives); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 304-08 (2015) (arguing that 
virtual contacts alone are insufficient to create Fourth Amendment rights for foreign-
located persons absent physical contacts or a legal relationship with the United States). 
 40. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV 1503, 1507 & 
n.19 (2013) (noting that “[v]irtually all legal scholarship approaches cyber-security from 
the standpoint of the criminal law or the law of armed conflict” and collecting the 
leading scholarship on both perspectives). 
 41. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE 36, 42-43, 45, 54 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (presenting a nonbinding 
formulation of the international law norms applicable to cyberwarfare, unanimously 
agreed upon by a group of international experts brought together by the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of 
Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839-57 (2012) (discussing the challenges of 
obtaining a consensus as to how an individual cyberattack should be classified despite 
the consensus that cyberattacks could be classified as a prohibited “internationally 
wrongful act,” “use of force,” or “armed attack”). For an extensive discussion of the 
debate surrounding the definition of “force” and “armed attack” in Articles 2(4) and 51 
of the U.N. Charter, see Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to 
the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 431-37 (2011).  
 42. In 2002, for example, Russian authorities charged an FBI agent with violating hacking 
and espionage laws by logging into a secure computer located in Russia and collecting 
data. See Mike Brunker, FBI Agent Charged with Hacking, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2002), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078784. The FBI obtained log-on credentials from 
Russian hackers who were lured into the United States as part of an elaborate sting 
operation. Id. More recently, in 2014 U.S. authorities charged members of the Chinese 
military under U.S. economic espionage laws for exfiltration of intellectual property 
data from U.S. corporations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five 
Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor 
footnote continued on next page 
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To be sure, the FBI’s existing hacking techniques, properly executed, do 
not rise to the level of a cyber “armed attack,” which would permit a state to 
respond with force under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.43 Nor is there an 
absolute prohibition on cross-border cyberoperations as a matter of 
international law.44 But the scope of harm a cross-border cyberoperation 
might cause varies, as does interpretation of existing international norms.45 
Indeed, “[p]recisely when a non-consensual cyber operation violates the 
sovereignty of another State is a question . . . that ultimately will be resolved 
through the practice and opinio juris of States.”46 As such, the United States has 
an interest in leading the effort to clarify existing international norms as 
applied to government hacking and the development of norms through 
diplomatic measures.47 
These circumstances highlight the failure of the existing rules to regulate 
the use of network investigative techniques. Rank-and-file law enforcement 
officials48 have discretion over which crimes trigger the use of hacking 
techniques, the range of techniques that may be used once a warrant authorizes 
a search, and the ability to target computers of nonsuspects. Because the legal 
process governed by Rule 41 presumes that targets are territorially located, it 
does not consider the risk of potentially significant foreign relations 
consequences or encourage law enforcement to engage with foreign relations 
or national security experts in other parts of government. 
This Article is the first to consider the cross-border implications of the use 
of network investigative techniques to pursue targets on the dark web and the 
institutional design problems that result. Broadly, it asks whether (and how) 
the legal architecture of cross-border investigations should adapt to the dark 
web, a space that defies our conceptions of geography and identity, and a 
reality where investigative activities for everyday crimes have a heightened 
 
Organization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.  
 43. U.N. Charter art. 51. Forceful responses to hostilities below the threshold of an “armed 
attack” are only permissible with U.N. Security Council authorization. Specifically, 
Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to take measures that do not involve armed 
force, whereas Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to escalate measures to the 
use of armed force in the event nonforceful measures are inadequate. See id. arts. 41-42. 
 44. Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on International Law and 
Stability in Cyberspace, Address at Berkeley Law School (Nov. 10, 2016), https:// 
www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf. 
 45. See infra Part II.C.5. 
 46. Egan, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. 
 48. By “rank-and-file,” this Article means “frontline agents who interface with the public.” 
See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 
210 (2015). 
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extraterritorial—and thus foreign relations—impact. More narrowly, it 
contends that extraterritorial aspects of network investigative techniques 
demonstrate the need for new substantive and procedural regulations that 
balance law enforcement goals with countervailing foreign relations interests.  
This Article then identifies the failures of the existing legal process, 
suggests a number of substantive policy preferences that the executive branch 
should implement in response, and lays out a regulatory scheme for their 
implementation and enforcement that involves “a complex, dynamic 
interaction of institutions that simultaneously work together, challenge each 
other, defend themselves and divide responsibility.”49 While the judiciary’s 
checks will remain essential to the implementation and enforcement of 
network investigative techniques, self-regulation within the executive branch 
and regulation from Congress are needed to produce decisions that are reliable, 
legitimate, and in the public interest.  
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes how existing surveil-
lance methods fail to solve crimes on the dark web and how the hacking 
techniques police use in response will unavoidably result in cross-border 
cyberexfiltration operations. Part II turns from the facts to the governing law, 
focusing on how the rules of criminal procedure limit the exercise of existing 
law enforcement functions to the territorial United States but fail to function 
in the same way when applied to network investigative techniques on the dark 
web. Cross-border cyberexfiltration operations are in obvious tension with 
international norms and thus raise a variety of foreign relations risks. Part III 
evaluates the shortcomings of the existing legal process and argues that a new 
regulatory framework is needed to govern network investigative techniques. It 
also offers initial thoughts as to what the new rules might look like and which 
institutions should set, implement, and enforce them.  
Importantly, this Article does not attempt to resolve every issue prompted 
by the dark web or hacking techniques. Nor does it attempt to resolve the issue 
how states should regulate cross-border cyberoperations. Instead, it is intended 
to offer a policymaking framework for this new surveillance technology that 
minimizes immediate foreign relations and national security risks and allocates 
the authority to make new decisions on appropriate procedures to the 
institutions most competent to address them. To that end, the ultimate 
question is not how well the status quo functions but rather whether 
adjustments may produce better foreign relations outcomes without sacrificing 
law enforcement’s ability to identify and locate criminal suspects that have 
taken cover on the dark web. 
 
 49. See Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 
463, 467 (book review).  
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I. Law Enforcement in the Dark  
A. The Dark Web 
The dark web is a private global computer network that enables users to 
conduct anonymous transactions without revealing any trace of their location. 
One such private network, whose characteristics I will use as a model for my 
analysis, is the Tor Network.50 Computers on the Tor Network use an 
encrypted communications protocol that cannot be accessed using normal web 
browsers. Instead, they require the use of special software, like the Tor 
Browser. Proper use of the Tor Network makes it practically impossible for 
governments to trace the location of computers hosting “hidden” websites on 
the network, the location of computers accessing those hidden websites, or the 
location of computers that tunnel through the network to “anonymously” visit 
public websites on the World Wide Web.51  
The Tor Network protects its users from two types of surveillance. First, it 
protects users from a common form of surveillance called “traffic analysis,” 
which is the real-time interception and examination of communications in 
order to deduce information.52 Second, it prevents governments from using 
communications “metadata”—information about a communication, such as its 
source, destination, and size—acquired from third-party service providers to 
draw conclusions about the communicators and their behavior.53  
 
 50. The terms “dark web” and “Tor Network” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Article. The Tor Network was originally developed by the U.S. military and is now 
open source and publicly funded. See generally KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R44101, DARK WEB 3 (2015); Tor: Sponsors, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/ 
about/sponsors.html.en (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (listing past and present contributors 
to the Tor Network).  
 51. An “overlay network” is a computer network that is built on top of another network. 
Computers in the overlay network can be thought of as being connected by virtual or 
logical links, each of which corresponds to a path that often runs through many 
physical links, in the underlying physical network. Examples of overlay network 
deployments include virtual private networks, peer-to-peer networks such as Napster 
and BitTorrent, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services such as Skype. See 
Guillermo Agustín Ibáñez Fernández, New Computer Network Paradigms and Virtual 
Organizations, in 2 GORAN D. PUTNIK & MARIA MANUELA CUNHA, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
NETWORKED AND VIRTUAL ORGANIZATIONS 1066, 1073 (2008); see also 2 IN LEE, 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT FOR 
BUSINESS 871 & tbl.2 (2009) (referring to overlay network deployments); Roger 
Dingledine et al., Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (n.d.), 
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf. 
 52. See Stephen Northcutt, Traffic Analysis, SANS TECH. INST. (May 16, 2007), 
http://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-laboratory/article/traffic-analysis. 
 53. See Tony Gill, Metadata and the Web, in INTRODUCTION TO METADATA 20, 22 (Murtha 
Baca ed., 2d ed. 2008) (defining “metadata” as “a structured description of the essential 
attributes of an information object” (italics omitted)); David Talbot, Dissent Made Safer: 
footnote continued on next page 
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As a technical matter, the Tor Network protects users’ communications 
from government surveillance because it disassociates communications 
“metadata” from communications “content” and bounces message packets off 
several intermediate computers, or “proxies,” before steering them to their 
originally intended destination.54 Proxy computers are scattered around the 
globe, provided by people who have volunteered their computers to the 
anonymity network.55  
As a practical matter, the Tor Network can protect user communications 
from traffic analysis in two ways. First, users can “tunnel” through the Tor 
Network when communicating with publicly accessible webpages on the 
World Wide Web. As a result, when a user tunnels through the Tor Network 
in order to browse a webpage, her Internet traffic appears to originate at a 
proxy computer rather than at her true connection. Conversely, from the 
perspective of an ISP, traffic from the user’s computer appears to be heading to 
another proxy computer rather than to the actual intended destination.  
Thus, someone located in Seattle who has anonymized his communica-
tions using a series of proxies, the last of which is located in Italy, will appear 
to the destination webpage to be a user in Italy. Likewise, someone in Iran who 
has run his communications through a series of proxies, the last of which is 
located in San Francisco, will appear to the destination website as a web surfer 
from San Francisco and to the local ISP in Iran as though he were attempting to 
communicate with a proxy computer. 
The second way people can use the Tor Network to protect their commu-
nications is through the Tor Network’s hidden services feature, which allows 
people to host content or services without exposing the physical location of 
their servers. Hidden services are only accessible by those who use software 
 
How Anonymity Technology Could Save Free Speech on the Internet, MIT TECH. REV.  
(Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/413091/dissent-made-safer (“In 
the United States, for example, libraries and employers often block content, and 
people’s Web habits can be—and are—recorded for marketing purposes by Internet 
service providers (ISPs) and by the sites themselves.”). 
 54. The Tor Network is currently maintained by the Tor Project, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
based in the United States and funded partly by a number of federal grants from the 
U.S. government. See Natascha Divac & Sam Schechner, Munich Attack Investigation 
Shines Light on ‘DarkWeb,’ WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2016, 9:03 PM ET), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/before-the-shootings-munich-gunman-visited-the-dark-web 
-1469558210; Damian Paletta, How the U.S. Fights Encryption—and Also Helps Develop It, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:31 AM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-u-s 
-fights-encryptionand-also-helps-develop-it-1456109096; see also Tor: Sponsors, supra 
note 50.  
 55. See FINKLEA, supra note 50, at 3-4, 4 n.20. As discussed in Part II.A below, foreign-located 
proxy computers are out of reach of U.S. subpoena authority unless their owners fall 
under the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts (for instance, due to nationality or 
territorial presence).  
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that enables them to get on the Tor Network, and even then, communications 
between a hidden service (such as the Silk Road) and its users occur though a 
“rendezvous point,” a proxy that provides an additional layer of protection 
from traffic analysis.  
Civil liberties advocates promote the use of the Tor Network to maintain 
free speech, privacy, and anonymity. For example, the Tor Network may be 
used to circumvent government censorship, enabling users to access online 
destinations that have been blocked by authoritarian regimes.56 The Tor 
Network can also be used to facilitate spaces online where individuals can 
conduct sensitive communications without fear of being tracked. For example, 
individuals may want to anonymize their communications to research 
sensitive issues such as physical or mental illness or to engage in political 
dissent without government detection. Businesses may want to use the Tor 
Network to prevent corporate spies from gaining any competitive advantage 
by learning whom their employees are communicating with or what topics 
they are researching.  
The added protection of the “hidden services” feature can also be used to 
circumvent a common censorship technique used by repressive regimes where 
websites deemed unfit for public consumption (such as blogs that promote 
dissent) are taken down and their web administrators arrested.57 Journalists 
and whistleblower groups also use the Tor Network’s hidden services feature 
to communicate with sources. For example, SecureDrop, an open source 
whistleblower submission system initially created for the New Yorker, can be 
 
 56. Some governments have responded by enacting regulations around the use of the Tor 
Network or blocking access to known proxy nodes in the Tor Network. See, e.g., 
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Turkey Doubles Down on Censorship with Block on VPNs, 
Tor, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 4, 2016, 2:20 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/ 
read/turkey-doubles-down-on-censorship-with-block-on-vpns-tor. This, in turn, has 
led to the development of “bridge relay” technology that enables the user to gain access 
to the Tor Network by accessing Tor relays that are not listed in the main Tor 
directory (and thus are unknown to government censors). See Tor: Bridges, TOR 
PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 57. If government agents are unable to locate the server hosting the blog, they cannot 
physically take it down (in the event it is located in-country) or request that a third 
party (or another country) do so. See infra Part I.B. Facebook set up a hidden services 
account in 2012. See Andy Greenberg, Why Facebook Launched Its Own ‘Dark Web’ Site, 
WIRED (Oct. 31, 2014, 12:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/facebook-tor 
-dark-site (“[N]o surveillance system watching either Facebook’s connection or the 
user’s local traffic should be able to match up a user’s identity with their Facebook 
activity.”); Alec Muffett, Making Connections to Facebook More Secure, FACEBOOK (Oct. 31, 
2014, 4:30 AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/making 
-connections-to-facebook-more-secure/1526085754298237. 
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used by media organizations to securely accept documents from and 
communicate with anonymous sources.58 
Not surprisingly, criminals and other malicious actors flocked to the dark 
web for its promise of an anonymous and secure platform for “conversation, 
coordination, and action.”59 Modern criminals use the dark web to carry out 
technology-driven crimes, such as computer hacking, identity theft, credit card 
fraud, and intellectual property theft.60 Platforms like the Silk Road provide a 
means for existing brick-and-mortar criminals to globalize their operations 
with virtual impunity. Increasingly, criminals use the dark web to facilitate 
crimes traditionally conducted in the physical world, such as currency 
counterfeiting,61 drug distribution,62 child exploitation,63 human trafficking,64 
arms and ammunition sales,65 assassination,66 and terrorism.67  
B. Failure of Conventional Surveillance Methods 
According to the DOJ, use of the dark web by criminals to anonymize 
communications makes it “impossible for law enforcement” to pursue criminal 
suspects.68 In computer crime cases, locating the computer used by the 
perpetrator is the most critical step in discovering the perpetrator’s identity 
 
 58. Tom Lowenthal & Geoffrey King, How SecureDrop Helps CPJ Protect Journalists, 
COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (May 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://cpj.org/x/686d; 
see Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, SecureDrop: Aaron Swartz’s Platform for Whistleblowers 
Rebooted, MASHABLE (Oct. 15, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/10/15/secure-drop 
-aaron-swartz-freedom-of-the-press-foundation/#.Tu9ZMRgqkqm. 
 59. See FINKLEA, supra note 50, at 8. 
 60. See id. at 8-10 (describing ways in which the dark web facilitates criminal activity).  
 61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Charged in International Uganda-Based Cyber 
Counterfeiting Scheme (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-charged 
-international-uganda-based-cyber-counterfeiting-scheme. 
 62. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 1.  
 63. GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 206. 
 64. Id. at 207-08. 
 65. Id. at 205-06. 
 66. Id. at 206; see Andy Greenberg, Meet the ‘Assassination Market’ Creator Who’s 
Crowdfunding Murder with Bitcoins, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/11/18/meet-the-assassination-market-creator 
-whos-crowdfunding-murder-with-bitcoins/#2277df031ac1. 
 67. According to German authorities, eighteen-year-old gunman Ali David Sonboly likely 
bought his handgun—which he used to kill nine people and himself in Munich on  
July 22, 2016—illegally on the dark web. Ruth Bender & Christopher Alessi, Munich 
Shooter Likely Bought Reactivated Pistol on Dark Net, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2016, 4:23 PM 
ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/munich-shooter-bought-recommissioned-pistol-on 
-dark-net-1469366686.  
 68. Letter from Mythili Raman to Judge Reena Raggi, supra note 25, at 2.  
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and collecting evidence to build a successful prosecution.69 Without the 
perpetrator’s laptop, investigators will lack evidence attributing virtual 
criminal conduct to an actual person.70  
Conventional investigative methods rely on collection of data from third 
parties through compulsion and consent. When digital evidence is controlled 
by a person or entity subject to U.S. personal jurisdiction, compulsory process 
is used to obtain digital evidence. When digital evidence is outside U.S. 
jurisdiction—such as when it is controlled by an entity with no physical 
presence or assets in the United States—formal and informal law enforcement 
cooperation mechanisms are used to obtain it.  
Investigators typically begin a computer crime investigation with nonde-
script information about the perpetrator’s online alias, such as the e-mail 
address used to transmit communications.71 Investigators may then decide to 
request all account information associated with the e-mail address from the 
third-party e-mail provider. In the event the e-mail service provider is beyond 
U.S. jurisdiction, the investigators will likely initiate protocols to use 
diplomatic channels to request that the host country provide the evidence. 
Before the advent of the dark web, the third-party disclosure would yield “true” 
identifying information—such as an Internet Protocol (IP) address registered 
with the ISP72—from which investigators could infer the user’s log-on 
location.73 Once the location of the device was determined, investigators could 
apply for a warrant to physically seize the device and extract its contents.74 
 
 69. Cf. Michael B. Mukasey, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI 
Operations 7 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (“In most 
ordinary criminal investigations, the immediate objectives include . . . identifying, 
locating, and apprehending the perpetrators . . . .”).  
 70. See 3 PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
R-1778-DOJ, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 65 
(1975), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/148118NCJRS.pdf (defining a 
“solved” case as one where investigators know “the identity of the perpetrator(s), even 
if additional work [is] needed to locate the perpetrators or to establish the facts needed 
to prove guilt in court”). 
 71. See, e.g., Sanders Affidavit, supra note 17, ¶¶ 5-6, 11 (listing nondescript e-mail addresses 
used to communicate threatening messages to a school). 
 72. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 
284 (2005) (“In most cases, the biggest investigative lead comes in the form of an 
originating Internet Protocol (IP) address recorded by the bank’s servers.”). 
 73. Cf. Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 895, 912-13 (2011) (describing various technologies that enable IP geolocation). 
 74. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 285 (“The process of collecting electronic evidence in 
computer hacking cases generally divides into three steps. It begins with the collection 
of stored evidence from third-party servers, turns next to prospective surveillance, and 
ends with the forensic investigation of the suspect’s computer.”). 
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Increasingly, digital evidence is beyond U.S. jurisdiction. When evidence is 
not in the custody or control of a party that falls under U.S. jurisdiction, 
investigators use consent-based cross-border evidence collection methods, 
implemented through a series of formal and informal relationships.75 The 
principal and least controversial tool for evidence collection in such cases is a 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).76 MLATs facilitate law enforcement 
cooperation and assistance in support of ongoing criminal investigations or 
proceedings.77 MLATs generally contain provisions for locating and 
identifying persons and items, serving process, executing search warrants, 
taking witness depositions, summoning witnesses; and seizing assets.78  
MLATs are negotiated by the U.S. Department of State79 and implemented 
by the DOJ’s Office of International Affairs (OIA), the DOJ’s foreign relations 
office.80 Once the agreement goes into force, the OIA is the “[c]entral 
[a]uthority” tasked with working with “foreign counterparts to ensure 
effective treaty implementation.”81 The OIA also serves an interdepartment 
coordination role, briefing “the Attorney General and other senior [DOJ] 
officials on international issues and provid[ing] advice on sensitive law 
enforcement matters that could impact the foreign relations and strategic 
interests of the United States.”82 
In addition to formal diplomatic mechanisms, federal law enforcement 
actors exchange criminal investigation-related information through informal 
channels and relationships cultivated to facilitate interstate law enforcement 
cooperation and access to evidence.83 The United States also engages in joint 
investigations, which are coordinated investigative efforts among law 
enforcement agencies of different countries in criminal matters.84 
 
 75. In the past, the use of network investigative techniques overseas has relied on consent-
based mechanisms. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 76. See 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 962.1 (2013) (providing a brief 
historical overview of MLATs and a list of bilateral MLATs in force). 
 77. See id. § 962.1(a). 
 78. See id.  
 79. See id. § 962.1. 
 80. See Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Evidence Located Abroad, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-oia/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-evidence 
-located-abroad (last updated June 11, 2015). 
 81. Office of International Affairs (OIA), U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal 
-oia (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Evidence Located Abroad, supra note 80. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009); In re 
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1089-93 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Behety, 
32 F.3d 503, 510-11 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 775-
footnote continued on next page 
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Consider an elementary school that receives a series of bomb threats by e-
mail.85 The perpetrator uses a nondescript e-mail address and leaves no clues 
that can be used to discover his true identity.86 Instead, investigators must 
follow the digital trail the perpetrator’s computer has laid out. Investigators 
will likely first subpoena the e-mail service provider whose services were used 
to communicate the threat, requesting disclosure of evidence associated with 
the perpetrator’s account.87 If the ISP does not fall under U.S. jurisdiction—for 
example, if it is located in Italy—investigators will use formal and informal 
mechanisms to seek assistance from cooperating agencies abroad. Investigators 
may pursue formal procedures, calling the OIA and triggering the MLAT 
protocols in Italy. The lead investigator may also use informal channels, such 
as his personal relationships with foreign law enforcement authorities. Either 
way, the ISP’s disclosure will likely include an IP “address log” detailing the 
activity history for the e-mail address.88 
Use of the dark web by the perpetrator, however, renders these conven-
tional evidence collection methods obsolete. Recall that when someone tunnels 
though the dark web to browse a public webpage, his Internet traffic appears to 
originate from one of thousands of “proxy” computers rather than the one he is 
using.89 Without the ability to obtain a true location for the targeted device, 
investigators are unable to initiate conventional evidence collection protocols. 
 
77 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States v. Castro, 175 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-33 (D.P.R. 2001); cf. 
ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TYPOLOGY ON MUTUAL LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE IN FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES 51 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti 
-bribery/TypologyMLA2012.pdf (describing “Joint Investigative Teams,” which are 
used by European Union member countries and allow “two or more countries to form 
a team to conduct a single criminal investigation”). 
 85. This hypothetical is loosely based on a case from 2007. See Sanders Affidavit, supra  
note 17, ¶ 11. 
 86. Cf. id. ¶ 6. 
 87. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2015) (requiring third-party ISPs to disclose user account 
information with a subpoena).  
 88. If the ISP keeps comprehensive records, additional information such as a billing address 
may also be disclosed. Id.; see Kerr, supra note 72, at 286 n.11 (citing United States v. 
Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (D. Kan. 2000), as an example of a case where the 
customer’s billing address and telephone number were disclosed). Once a suspect is 
identified, investigators and prosecutors decide whether there is sufficient evidence to 
bring a successful prosecution. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 289. The suspect’s true identity 
opens up the door to all sorts of evidence and investigation methods. This may include 
indirect collection of digital evidence (for instance, in the form of e-mails, GPS, and 
telephony data) from third parties through compelled disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2711; see also infra Part II.A. This may also include direct collection, authorized by 
warrant, in the form of physical surveillance methods or collection of digital evidence 
from the device used to perpetrate the crime. See infra Part II.B.  
 89. See supra Part I.A. 
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In the dark web version of our hypothetical, the suspect tunnels though 
the dark web to anonymize a connection to a third-party e-mail service 
provider. Thus, surveillance methods that depend on disclosures from third-
party ISPs can no longer be used to locate investigation targets.90 Investigators 
are still authorized to subpoena the e-mail provider for relevant account 
information. However, this time, the third-party disclosures reveal to 
investigators only that the suspect anonymized his communications.91 The 
investigators are unable to physically seize the computer, whether through 
direct means or with the cooperation of another country. With no other leads, 
the investigation grinds to a halt.92  
Use of the dark web by criminal actors enables secret, untraceable criminal 
activity to take place at scale.93 The existence of hidden services like the Silk 
Road “dramatically lower[s] the entry barriers into the underground 
 
 90. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 286. 
 91. The investigators know this because the IP address received is that of a known “proxy” 
computer. When someone using the Tor Network browses a webpage, his Internet 
traffic appears to originate from one of hundreds of Tor’s exit nodes rather than his 
home connection, and the communication cannot be traced backwards. Conversely, 
from the perspective of an ISP on the originating end, traffic from the Tor user appears 
to be heading toward one of hundreds of Tor’s entry nodes rather than the actual 
intended destination. As a result, law enforcement can no longer use third-party 
disclosures to identify a target. See generally FINKLEA, supra note 50, at 3-5.  
 92. Notably, in all publicly available warrant applications reviewed by the Author, the 
application affiant has asserted that locating the true IP address of the perpetrator is 
impossible but for the use of network investigative techniques. For example, one 
affidavit stated: 
Due to the unique nature of the Tor network and the method by which the network protects 
the anonymity of its users by routing communications through multiple other computers or 
“nodes,” . . . other investigative procedures that are usually employed in criminal investiga-
tions of this type have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if they are tried. 
Affidavit of Special Agent Douglas Macfarlane in Support of Application for Search 
Warrant ¶ 31, In re Search of Computs. That Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-
SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015); see also United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *5-6 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016) (“The critical point is 
that without the use of such techniques as [network investigative techniques], agents 
seeking to track a Tor user to his home computer will not be able to take that pursuit 
beyond the exit node from which the Tor user accessed the regular Internet.”), report 
and recommendation adopted by 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67092 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016). 
 93. It is perhaps for this reason that the FBI considers computer crimes to be “the most 
significant crimes confronting the United States.” FINKLEA, supra note 50, at 9; see also 
James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, The FBI and the Private Sector: Closing the Gap in Cyber 
Security, Remarks at the RSA Cyber Security Conference (Feb. 26, 2014), https:// 
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-the-private-sector-closing-the-gap-in-cyber 
-security (“Before he left, Director Mueller told me that he believed cyber issues would 
come to dominate my tenure as counterterrorism had dominated his time as Director. 
And I believe he is right. We must be agile and predictive on every front. And we must 
use every tool and authority at our disposal to stop these malicious activities.”). 
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economy—for both buyers and sellers alike.”94 The resurgence of several 
underground marketplaces in the wake of the Silk Road shutdown underscores 
the asymmetry between investigators’ ability to track unlawful activity and 
criminals’ capacity to commit crimes on the dark web.95  
C. Hacking as an Investigative Tool on the Dark Web 
Anonymity tools are not the first technological change to leapfrog law 
enforcement surveillance capabilities.96 The FBI has termed this leapfrog 
phenomenon “going dark.”97 In the 1990s, for instance, law enforcement lost its 
ability to wiretap calls when telephone companies switched from copper cables 
to digital telephony.98 The result was the passage of the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994, which required telephone 
carriers to install standardized equipment so they could assist police with 
electronic wiretaps.99 However, such “backdoor” solutions are not technologi-
cally feasible on the dark web due to its decentralized architecture, use of open 
software, and core functionality requirements.100 
Network investigative techniques circumvent the challenges the dark web 
poses by using the Internet to facilitate the delivery and installation of 
surveillance software (malware101) on the target device.102 Formerly, an 
 
 94. Government Sentencing Submission, supra note 15, at 2. 
 95. See id. at 3, 13; Press Release, Sen. Tom Carper, supra note 14.  
 96. Bellovin et al., supra note 18, at 8-18 (providing a history of communications 
technologies leapfrogging law enforcement capabilities, including cellular telephony, 
VoIP, and end-to-end encryption). See generally William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and 
Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1804 (1998) (noting that criminals generally have an 
incentive to change patterns once law enforcement agencies adapt).  
 97. Going Dark, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational 
-technology/going-dark (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (describing the “going dark” issue as 
the FBI’s inability to access evidence due to technological barriers). 
 98. Bellovin et al., supra note 18, at 7 (noting that with the advent of digital telephony it 
was no longer possible to tap lines with the traditional method of “two alligator clips 
and a tape recorder”). 
 99. See id. at 6-7; see also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L.  
No. 103-414, § 103, 108 Stat. 4279, 4280-82 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002 
(2015)). 
 100. Bellovin et al., supra note 18, at 6-7, 18. A thorough discussion of how the open, 
distributed architecture of certain anonymity tools makes technological backdoors 
infeasible is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it is sufficient to know 
that (1) distributing a technology’s network architecture may place its components 
beyond a state’s jurisdictional reach and (2) using open architecture allows transferabil-
ity of components by independent third parties.  
 101. See supra note 17. 
 102. See Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King to Advisory Comm. on Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 32, at 2 (describing network investigative techniques as 
footnote continued on next page 
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investigator wishing to search a computer using conventional methods had to 
gain access to the physical location of the computer and generate a copy of its 
hard drive. This requires knowledge of the computer’s physical location, which 
the dark web obscures. 
Network investigative techniques create a way for investigators to reach a 
computer that does not require knowledge of its physical location. Rather than 
traversing “physical” pathways—such as roads and bridges—to reach the 
target’s physical address, investigators deploy malware that traverses “virtual” 
pathways—such as connections between computers and bridges between 
networks—to reach the computer’s virtual IP address. Importantly, the new 
methods can reach the same destination.103 Once malware penetrates the 
target, it converts the computer into a surveillance device. 
Network investigative techniques function in two steps: access to data and 
extraction of data.104 The “access” step can be thought of as arriving at the 
location of a file cabinet and picking its lock,105 and the “extraction” step can be 
thought of as rifling through the file cabinet’s contents.106  
 
“remote access searches, in which the government seeks to obtain access to electronic 
information or an electronic storage device by sending surveillance software over the 
Internet”). 
 103. A physical search requires knowing the physical location of a target computer. By 
contrast, a remote search requires a means to communicate with the target computer, 
such as an active e-mail address. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. 
 104. Description and analysis of predeployment and postexecution steps are beyond the 
scope of this Article. Of course, there are important steps that occur before deploy-
ment, such as vulnerability harvesting (analogized to gaining knowledge about the 
various types of locks that are in use by file cabinet makers and how to unlock them) 
and target reconnaissance (analogized to figuring out what types of locks a particular 
target uses and whether the attacker can access them). See generally Bellovin et al., supra 
note 18, at 34-41. 
 105. The “access” step requires two critical pieces of information: (1) the existence of a 
software vulnerability and (2) an available path or “attack vector” to successfully access 
and exploit that vulnerability. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF 
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 83 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC 
REPORT] (“Access would be an available path for reaching the file cabinet . . . .”). A 
vulnerability can be analogized to a faulty lock on the file cabinet. It is a security flaw 
or weakness that can be used by an attacker to compromise the system. A vulnerability 
can be (1) a code-based vulnerability, such as a weakness in the browser application 
used by the target; (2) a human vulnerability, where the weakness is a human who 
possesses credentials needed to access a system; or (3) a combination of the two, where a 
human vulnerability enables the attacker to deceive the user into performing an act 
that would (indirectly) cause the system to be compromised. At any rate, the relevant 
state action for the “access” step of our analysis is the execution of the attack vector to 
access and exploit a particular software or hardware vulnerability.  
 106. Id. (“The payload is the action taken by the intruder after the lock is picked.”).  
Searching Places Unknown 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (2017) 
1097 
In the access step, law enforcement deploys malware that travels across the 
Internet to the target device, where it exploits a software security vulnerability 
that enables access to the system.107 As in the physical world, an investigator 
may take one of many different paths in cyberspace to reach the location of a 
target. To that end, deployment mechanisms divide into three categories: spear 
phishing attacks, watering hole operations, and man-in-the-middle attacks. In 
a “spear phishing” operation, law enforcement targets an individual device by 
sending the target a communication (typically through e-mail or social media) 
to convince her to take a particular action—such as clicking on a link or 
opening an attachment—that triggers the delivery of malware.108 In a 
“watering hole” operation, investigators first gain control of a server and then 
use it to distribute attacks to all visitors.109 And in a “man-in-the-middle” 
attack, investigators lodge themselves between two endpoints of a communica-
tion so they can secretly relay or alter communications between parties.110 
In the extraction step, a set of malware instructions known as a “payload” 
is executed on the device, effectively turning it into a surveillance tool.111 Once 
installed, malware can cause a computer to perform any task the computer is 
capable of performing. For example, it may direct files and communications to 
a server controlled by law enforcement or gather images and sound at any time 
 
 107. See id. at 86-87; Bellovin et al., supra note 18, at 25-26.  
 108. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics to Spy on 
Suspects, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2013, 3:17 PM ET), http://on.wsj.com/14mj2pV (noting 
that investigators “us[e] a document or link that loads software when the [targeted] 
person clicks or views it”); cf. Tom N. Jagatic et al., Social Phishing, COMM. ACM, Oct. 
2007, at 94, 94, 96 (demonstrating empirically that phishing attacks impersonating a 
friend of the target are more successful than those in which the sender is not known to 
the target).  
 109. See, e.g., Darien Kindlund, Holiday Watering Hole Attack Proves Difficult to Detect and 
Defend Against, ISSA J., Feb. 2013, at 10, 11 (describing a watering hole attack that 
infected visitors of a certain page on the website of the Council of Foreign Relations); 
Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government Is Catching People Who Use Child Porn Sites, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), http://wpo.st/nom72 (describing the use of watering hole 
attacks used to hack computers that visit hidden child pornography sites). 
 110. Bellovin and his coauthors describe a man-in-the-middle attack as follows: 
A Man-in-the-Middle attack is a method of gaining access to target information in which an 
active attacker interrupts the connection between the target and another resource and 
surreptitiously inserts itself as an intermediary. This is typically done between a target and a 
trusted resource, such as a bank or email server. To the target the attacker pretends to be the 
bank, while to the bank the attacker pretends to be the target. Any authentication credentials 
required (e.g., passwords or certificates) are spoofed by the attacker, so that each side believes 
they are communicating with the other. But because all communications are being transmit-
ted through the attacker, the attacker is able to read and modify any messages it wishes to.  
  Bellovin et al., supra note 18, at 24 (bolding omitted).  
 111. See NRC REPORT, supra note 105, at 88. 
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the executing agent chooses.112 From behind a screen at the other end of the 
connection, investigators are able to deploy immensely powerful techniques 
that scale with ease to track and surveil suspects.  
But consider this important wrinkle: the clear majority of dark web users 
are outside the territorial United States.113 And because each computer’s 
location is theoretically indistinguishable from the next, any law enforcement 
target pursued on the dark web may be located overseas.114  
The overseas cyberexfiltration operations that result from the use of 
network investigative techniques are a significant change in the way U.S. law 
enforcement engages in cross-border investigations. Before the amendment to 
Rule 41, criminal legal process authorized methods for evidence collection that 
aligned with customary international law, where it is considered an incursion 
on another state’s sovereignty to carry out law enforcement functions within 
another state without that state’s consent. To that end, law enforcement 
agencies relied on the United States’ diplomatic relations and treaties with 
other countries, seeking permission from the host state before deploying 
personnel and requesting assistance from local authorities to collect foreign-
located evidence when possible. For instance, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration has recently confirmed that it has used hacking tools on 
seventeen devices in a foreign country pursuant to a foreign court order and 
with the cooperation of foreign officials.115  
In contrast to conventional methods, the exercise of extraterritorial law 
enforcement functions will be unilateral. It will not be limited to matters of 
national security, nor will it be coordinated with the State Department or 
other relevant agencies.116 Case-by-case investigatory decisions made by rank-
and-file officials117 will have direct overseas consequences. The foreign 
 
 112. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 
753, 755-56, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying on territorial limitation grounds an 
application for a warrant to use network investigative techniques that control the 
computer’s camera and calculate the latitude and longitude of the device); see also 
Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 18 (describing features of network investigative 
techniques).  
 113. See Top-10 Countries by Relay Users, supra note 28 (estimating that around 20% of the Tor 
Network’s daily users are based in the United States). 
 114. Targeting on the dark web is blind; investigators do not know where the target is 
located and thus cannot control the route network investigative techniques take to get 
there. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1072-
73 (2001). 
 115. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. 
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. 2 (July 14, 2015) (on file with 
author).  
 116. Ghappour, supra note 26.  
 117. See supra note 48. 
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relations risks that may be incurred call into question the wisdom of allowing 
rank-and-file officials to drive decisionmaking as to what crimes should 
trigger the use of hacking techniques, what hacking techniques should be used, 
and whose property interests may be targeted. 
II. Law Enforcement out of Bounds 
A. Conventional Methods Are in Harmony with International Law 
International law delimits one state’s power over another state’s territorial 
sovereignty118 by restricting states’ exercise of prescriptive, adjudicative, and 
enforcement jurisdiction.119 In the context of criminal law, the United States 
exercises prescriptive jurisdiction when Congress enacts statutes that 
criminalize conduct and enforcement jurisdiction when its law enforcement 
agencies investigate, apprehend, or prosecute a wrongdoer.120  
Prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction “are not geograph-
ically coextensive.”121 International law is most permissive with respect to 
 
 118. Territorial sovereignty can be defined as the principle that each state is coequal and has 
the final authority within its territorial limits. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and 
the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 & 
n.5 (1998) (citing Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 66, 86 (1988) (“The assertion of final authority within a given territory is the 
core element in any definition of sovereignty.”); and Janice E. Thomson, Sovereignty in 
Historical Perspective: The Evolution of State Control over Extraterritorial Violence, in THE 
ELUSIVE STATE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 227, 227 (James A. 
Caporaso ed., 1989) (“Despite their debate over whether the state is a withering colossus 
or a highly adaptive entity . . . , international relations theorists agree on an even more 
fundamental point. Both liberal interdependence and realist theories rest on the 
assumption that the state controls at least the principal means of coercion.”)); see also 
Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (“Sovereignty in 
the relations between States signifies . . . the right to exercise [on its territory], to the 
exclusion of any other States, the functions of a State.”). 
 119. Broadly, “jurisdiction” can be defined as a state’s “right under international law to 
regulate matters not exclusively of domestic concern.” See F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 9 (1964). “Prescriptive 
jurisdiction” refers to a state’s ability “to make its law applicable to the activities, 
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (AM. LAW INST. 
1987). “Adjudicative jurisdiction” is defined as a state’s ability “to subject persons or 
things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals.” Id. § 401(b). “Enforce-
ment jurisdiction” refers to a state’s ability to “compel compliance . . . with its laws.” Id.  
§ 401(c). 
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 432(1). 
 121. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
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prescriptive jurisdiction. It permits a state to criminalize conduct that occurs 
beyond its borders so long as the prescribed conduct has territorial effects.122 
But “[a] state having jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law does not necessarily 
have jurisdiction to enforce it in all cases.”123 “[U]nlike a state’s prescriptive 
jurisdiction, which is not strictly limited by territorial boundaries, 
enforcement jurisdiction by and large continues to be strictly territorial.”124 
Indeed, there is unanimous consensus among states that “no state may engage 
in an act of coercion in the territory of another state without the latter’s 
consent.”125  
Thus, while Congress may criminalize conduct that occurs wholly 
overseas so long as it has domestic “effects,”126 international law forbids U.S. 
investigators from directly exercising law enforcement functions in other 
countries without first obtaining consent.127 “[A] state cannot investigate a 
 
 122. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[A]ny state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside 
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends . . . .”). 
The application of federal statutes to overseas acts is permissible under international 
law only if the criminalized conduct has or is intended to have harmful effects on U.S. 
territory, nationals, or security interests; is a universally condemned offense; or was 
committed by a U.S. national. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 
AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 439-42 (Supp. 1935); see also INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 11-16 (2009), http://www.ibanet.org/ 
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839-A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E 
(noting that “states have long recognized the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction 
over persons or events located outside its territory in certain circumstances, based on 
the effects doctrine, the nationality or personality principle, the protective principle[,] 
or the universality principle” and providing an overview of each basis of jurisdiction).  
 123. Saint-Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1316 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 7(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).  
 124. Id.; see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 664 (2009).  
 125. Buxbaum, supra note 124, at 664; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2); JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 478-79 (8th ed. 2012). The principle of 
nonintervention prohibits all acts that are intended “to coerce another State in order to 
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure 
from it advantages of any kind.” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).  
 126. As a matter of domestic law, Congress may extend the reach of the criminal law 
extraterritorially, subject to constitutional limits. Knox, supra note 37, at 351 n.1 
(“Congress could decide to exceed [international law limits] if it chose to place the 
United States in violation of international law.”); see Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 37, 
at 1223 (arguing for jurisdictional limits on legislative authority that sound in 
constitutional due process). 
 127. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 432(2) (“A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the 
territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly 
footnote continued on next page 
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crime, arrest a suspect, or enforce its judgment or judicial processes in another 
state’s territory without the latter state’s permission.”128 Nonetheless, using 
conventional mechanisms, U.S. criminal investigators collect digital evidence 
located anywhere in the world while limiting the exercise of enforcement 
mechanisms to the territorial United States.129 
The evidence collection methods authorized under the pre-amendment 
version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are in harmony with 
international law’s restrictions on enforcement jurisdiction. Despite their 
global reach, the rules of criminal procedure may only be enforced with respect 
to persons and property that touch the United States.130  
In this context, digital evidence collection can be divided into direct and 
indirect collection mechanisms. Direct collection typically involves coerced 
entry131 into a place by government actors for the purpose of acquiring 
evidence of a crime, and it typically requires a search warrant.132 Indirect 
collection, by contrast, involves service of a subpoena or court order that 
 
authorized officials of that state.”); CRYER ET AL., supra note 38, § 3.2.3, at 44 (using the 
term “executive jurisdiction” to discuss enforcement jurisdiction and defining it as “the 
right to effect legal process coercively, such as to arrest someone, or undertake searches 
and seizures”); see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 625 (9th Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (“Extraterritorial application [of a criminal statute] . . . does not 
automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority.”), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  
 128. INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 122, at 10. 
 129. See infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text. 
 130. Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 432 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“[T]he interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise 
coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in 
question.”); Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 372 (2009) (“The exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in the 
territory of another state, without its consent, breaches the non-intervention  
principle. . . . [E]xtraterritorial enforcement measures will nearly always be considered 
illegal [under customary international law].”). 
 131. Direct collection includes forcibly entering a space where the targeted device is located 
and subsequently bypassing security restrictions on that device. However, entry or 
access need not cause physical damage to be “coerced.” See, e.g., Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 
F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 132. This type of government conduct typically falls under the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment, which requires investigators to first obtain a search warrant 
before performing the collection activity. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A search warrant 
constitutes the judicial authorization, made upon a finding of probable cause, of an 
activity that is uniquely assigned to law enforcement—intruding upon an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy to conduct a search and seizure. A search warrant is 
self-executing; it authorizes an investigator to directly coerce entry or access to, and 
extraction of digital evidence from, a computer or electronic media. See, e.g., Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (explaining that searches may be “executed 
without delay and without prior notice, thereby preserving the element of surprise”); 
see also Search Warrant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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imposes an affirmative duty on its recipient to either produce evidence under 
that recipient’s control or face sanctions for noncompliance.133 In the digital 
context, a physical seizure of a computer is a direct collection, as is the use of 
network investigative techniques. The subpoena power, on the other hand, is 
an indirect collection mechanism, as is the use of compelled technical assistance 
to conduct a wiretap.  
Direct collection of foreign-located evidence using conventional methods 
is an obvious exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.134 Criminal procedure 
requires direct collection of digital evidence to be conducted pursuant to a 
search warrant, which authorizes investigators to exercise coercive “search and 
seizure” powers directed toward a particular place to be searched or thing to be 
seized.135 Investigators executing a search warrant may use coercive force and 
may even damage the targeted items or premises when necessary to effectuate a 
particular search or seizure.136 
Search warrant authority (and direct collection methods exercised under 
search warrant authority) does not generally extend beyond the territorial 
United States.137 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 generally restricts a 
 
 133. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that a Canadian bank operating in the United States was obliged to produce 
documents located in the Cayman Islands in response to a grand jury subpoena); see also 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“The test for the production of documents is control, not location.”). 
 134. As Justice Joseph Story explained in 1841, territorial sovereignty implies that “no state 
or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or 
bind persons not resident therein.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND 
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 
§ 20 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 2d ed. 1841) (emphasis added); see also 
Goldsmith, supra note 118, at 480. 
 135. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (holding that officers must 
generally secure a search warrant before conducting a search of data stored on a 
smartphone confiscated incident to a lawful arrest); Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 813 (“The 
principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a 
search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a 
search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.”). 
 136. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“To preserve 
advantages of speed and surprise, [a warrant] is issued without prior notice and is 
executed, often by force, with an unannounced and unanticipated physical intrusion.”). 
 137. In 1990, the Supreme Court, ruling that foreign-located nonresident aliens are not 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, strongly suggested that the Warrant Clause 
has no extraterritorial application. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 
274-75 (1990); see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 
169 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n Verdugo-Urquidez, seven justices of the Supreme Court endorsed 
the view that U.S. courts are not empowered to issue warrants for foreign searches.”); 
United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[F]oreign searches have 
neither been historically subject to the warrant procedure, nor could they be as a 
practical matter.”); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
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court’s authority to issue warrants to the district of the magistrate making the 
decision.138 Exceptions are generally limited to instances in which the search 
warrant relates to American diplomatic or consular missions in foreign 
states.139 Indeed, any collection of evidence that requires an assertion of 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction triggers the formal and informal 
cooperation protocols discussed in Part I.B above.  
Indirect collection of foreign-located evidence, by contrast, does not 
require the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction overseas. Instead, compelled 
disclosure orders impose an affirmative duty on third parties to disclose 
evidence in their possession or control in response to a specific request.140 A 
person or entity that fails to produce evidence in its control may face domestic 
sanctions for noncompliance.141 Critically, the steps of the collection act—
accessing and extracting foreign-located data—are performed by third parties, 
not state actors.142  
In practice, courts regularly issue and uphold orders that compel disclosure 
of foreign-located evidence from third parties, so long as the third party falls 
under the court’s personal jurisdiction and has control over the evidence.143 
 
(“[T]here is presently no statutory basis for the issuance of a warrant to conduct 
searches abroad.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 138. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). 
 139. Id. 41(b)(5) (permitting out-of-district warrants to conduct searches in U.S. territories 
overseas and on the premises of diplomatic or consular missions in foreign states); see 
id. advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (“The rule is intended to authorize a 
magistrate judge to issue a search warrant in any of the locations for which 18 U.S.C.  
§ 7(9) provides jurisdiction.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2015) (defining the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States); cf. Note, Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Civilians Accompanying American Armed Forces Overseas, 71 HARV. L. REV. 712, 712 n.5 
(1958) (noting that at the time, there were no treaties providing consent other than 
Status of Forces Agreements and that the “United States can exercise jurisdiction over 
its civilians within a foreign territory only with the sovereign’s prior consent”). For an 
excellent treatment of the extraterritorial aspects of U.S. criminal enforcement 
jurisdiction under Status of Forces Agreements, see JOSEPH M. SNEE & A. KENNETH PYE, 
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 92-109 (1957).  
 140. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1); see also Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining a “subpoena” as a “writ or order commanding a person to appear before a 
court or other tribunal, subject to a penalty for failing to comply,” and defining a 
“subpoena duces tecum” as an order requiring a person “to appear in court and to bring 
specified documents, records, or things”). 
 141. See supra note 133. 
 142. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 832 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 143. See, e.g., id. at 826-28 (ordering production of evidence despite Cayman Island bank 
secrecy laws); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 
665, 670 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming an order to produce evidence despite a claim that it 
would violate Swiss law); United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 
1981) (ordering production despite possible criminal penalties under Swiss law); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon Simon Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1973) 
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Courts applying this principle have observed that “the operation of foreign law 
‘do[es] not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to 
its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may 
violate that [law].’”144  
In the digital context, the steps of indirect collection are much the same as 
in the physical world.145 For example, law enforcement may apply for court 
orders requiring U.S.-based providers to disclose digital evidence in their 
possession.146 The recipient of such orders may comply by providing the 
requested evidence. If she does not comply and cannot show good cause, she 
may face judicial enforcement in the form of civil contempt sanctions.147 
 
(Friendly, J.) (upholding in part a subpoena requiring an accountant to produce the 
contents of three locked file cabinets belonging to a client); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. 
Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *11-12 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) 
(ordering a party to produce digital evidence stored on servers in the Netherlands, 
despite the fact that doing so would violate Dutch privacy law); United States v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 584 F. Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (requiring production 
despite a Hong Kong judge’s bank secrecy order).  
 144. Linde v. Arab Bank, 706 F.3d 92, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.29 
(1987)).  
 145. See COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 134 (n.d.), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
docs/ssmanual2009.pdf [hereinafter CCIPS GUIDELINES] (“[I]nvestigators ordinarily do 
not themselves search through the provider’s computers in search of the materials 
described in the warrant. Instead, investigators serve the warrant on the provider as 
they would a subpoena, and the provider produces the material specified in the 
warrant.”). The operational trajectory is the same as the subpoena process. First, the 
court order is obtained. Second, the ISP is served with the order. Third, the third-party 
service provider gives law enforcement responsive evidence. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s 
Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222-24 (2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2703, 2711) (describing the 
steps of using the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to collect digital evidence). 
 146. Depending on the type of information an order seeks, law enforcement is required to 
show varying levels of suspicion. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA 
Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 620 tbl.2, 621 (2003) 
(describing “the continuum of court orders and legal processes” that the SCA uses to 
govern law enforcement collection of digital evidence); see also CCIPS GUIDELINES, 
supra note 145, at 127 (“Thus, a 2703(d) court order can compel everything that a 
subpoena can compel (plus additional information), and a search warrant can compel 
the production of everything that a 2703(d) order can compel (and then some).”). 
 147. Recently, the Second Circuit held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
compelled disclosure of digital evidence under the SCA, a thirty-year-old statute, does 
not apply to customer data stored outside the United States. See In re Warrant to Search 
a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 
201 (2d Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, No. 14-2985, 2017 WL 362765 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 
2017). However, such extraterritoriality would be consistent with the U.S. Constitution 
and international law’s bounds on enforcement jurisdiction, as would use of a grand 
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Critical to criminal procedure’s compliance with international norms, the 
United States is not authorized to “enforce its laws against an individual 
content provider from another country unless the content provider has a local 
presence.”148 Indeed, congressionally enacted enforcement mechanisms for 
indirect collection are territorial; the courts may order forfeiture only of 
domestic property.149  
Collection of foreign-located data using compulsory process complies with 
international law’s restrictions on enforcement jurisdiction so long as the 
enforcement mechanisms are limited to persons and property within the 
United States.150 By leveraging the threat of territorial enforcement (for 
instance, through an order authorizing seizure of property upon a finding of 
contempt), law enforcement is able to require companies to produce foreign-
located evidence.151 The United States takes no direct extraterritorial acts 
when it compels disclosures and receives information despite the fact that the 
motivating factor for the third party is the threat of U.S. (territorial) 
enforcement.152 All acts taken on foreign soil—including retrieval of foreign-
stored information and its transport to the United States—are performed by a 
third party.153  
 
jury subpoena to seek the same customer data stored outside the United States. See infra 
notes 150-53 and accompanying text.  
 148. Goldsmith, supra note 118, at 485.  
 149. When a court enters such orders, it exercises territorial enforcement jurisdiction. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 431 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Law enforcement authorities, too, exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction in executing such orders. Id. cmt. c. 
 150. Cf. In re Petition of Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 745 F.3d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J.) (noting that foreign nationals outside U.S. territory are beyond the court’s 
subpoena power). 
 151. Id. at 216-18. 
 152. In a case involving a U.S. discovery order relating to French witnesses and documents, 
the court found that the order did not intrude on French sovereignty or judicial 
custom. Adidas (Can.) Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 
0375 (PNL), 1984 WL 423, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984). The court concluded: 
No adverse party will enter on French soil to gather evidence (or otherwise). No oath need be 
administered on French soil or by a French judicial authority.  
What is required . . . on French soil is certain acts preparatory to the giving of evidence. 
[The company] must select appropriate employees to give depositions in the forum state: 
likewise it must select the relevant documents which it will reveal to its adversaries in the 
forum state. These acts do not call for French judicial participation. . . . In no way do those acts 
affront or intrude on French sovereignty.  
  Id.; see also In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a 
district court’s ordering of depositions to be conducted on German soil was not a 
violation of international law). 
 153. Adidas (Can.), 1984 WL 423, at *2; accord In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (holding that an order for compelled process “places obligations only on the 
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B. Failure of the Existing Rules 
The harmony154 between conventional evidence-gathering methods and 
international law’s restrictions on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction 
begins to unravel with the practice of network investigative techniques on the 
dark web. The amendment to Rule 41 governing search warrant venue 
requirements did little more than remove a procedural hurdle in the way of 
courts’ ability to issue warrants for territorial law enforcement searches and 
seizures.155 In applying the legal process for search warrants to network 
investigative techniques, law enforcement and courts assume that anonymized 
targets are territorially located during all stages of implementation and 
enforcement.156 After all, courts lack constitutional and statutory authority to 
issue extraterritorial warrants, and any such warrant would have no force in a 
foreign state without an agreement to the contrary.157  
Application of the existing rules to anonymized targets results in a bizarre 
structural arrangement: the courts have no authority over the extraterritorial 
aspect of network investigative techniques, yet the issuance of search warrants 
is a condition precedent to their execution. Network investigative techniques 
that wind up targeting computers in the territorial United States are 
authorized by warrant, while those that land overseas draw authority directly 
 
service provider to act”), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), reh’g en 
banc denied, No. 14-2985, 2017 WL 362765 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2017).  
 154. As summarized by James Crawford, U.S. courts “have taken the view that whenever 
activity abroad has consequences or effects within the US which are contrary to local 
legislation then the American courts may make orders requiring the . . . production of 
documents.” CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 479-80 (“Such orders may be enforced by 
action within the US against individuals or property present within [U.S.] territorial 
jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 155. See Memorandum from David Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Judge Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure 
2 (Oct. 20, 2014), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, supra note 32, at 133, 134 
(“What our proposal would accomplish is untying the hands of law enforcement when 
it is not yet known whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant because it is 
unknown whether the media is in the United States—and it accomplishes that by 
ensuring that a judge is available to hear the warrant application.”). 
 156. For example, one application requested and was granted a warrant to infect every 
computer that associated with a server located in Virginia. See United States v. 
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). 
The location listed on the warrant application was Virginia, even though it authorized 
over 8000 malware infections of computers located in 120 countries. Cox, FBI Hack, 
supra note 27 (“As far as is publicly known, these mass hacking techniques have been 
limited to child pornography investigations. But with the changes to Rule 41, there is a 
chance US authorities will expand their use to other crimes too.”). 
 157. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
Searching Places Unknown 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (2017) 
1107 
from the executive’s plenary powers to enforce the laws of the United States158 
and from statutes authorizing the DOJ and FBI to investigate individuals for 
violations of U.S. laws.159  
As for intra-agency checks and balances, the DOJ’s existing protocols on 
cross-border investigations cannot be applied before the deployment of 
network investigative techniques on the dark web because investigators are 
unable to discern a target’s location until after it has been hacked. For example, 
investigators are required to “use reasonable efforts to ascertain whether any 
pertinent computer system, data, witness, or subject is located in a foreign 
jurisdiction” and “follow the policies and procedures set out by their agencies 
for international investigations” to gather evidence located overseas.160 These 
procedures typically include consultation with the DOJ’s Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS)—the DOJ’s technology section—or the 
 
 158. This would require finding that pursuant to the constitutional command to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, “the President has the 
power to authorize agents of the executive branch to engage in law enforcement 
activities in addition to those provided by statute,” Auth. of the FBI to Override Int’l 
Law in Extraterritorial Law Enf’t Activities, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 176 (1989). Whether the 
mechanics of such authority violate the separation of powers is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For the purposes of this Article, I concede the claim that the Take Care 
Clause, in conjunction with the broad authorizing statutes carrying into execution 
core executive powers, gives the President raw authority to make these decisions and 
to delegate them to nonappointed members of the DOJ. See Auth. of the FBI, 13 Op. 
O.L.C. at 176. The 1989 Office of Legal Counsel opinion effectively overruled an 
opinion from 1980, which concluded that the FBI may not conduct extraterritorial 
apprehensions in violation of international law. See Extraterritorial Apprehension by 
the FBI, 4B Op. O.L.C. 543, 549 (1980). 
 159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2015); 28 U.S.C. § 533(1) (2015). The question whether by enacting 
these statutes Congress delegated authority to the DOJ and the FBI to violate interna-
tional law has not been addressed by the courts and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Under Chevron, “[i]f . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer 
[here, that it has authority to violate international law] is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). Scholars disagree regarding the extent of the deference owed the 
executive branch in the context of ambiguous statutory authority. Compare Eric A. 
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1220 
(2007) (arguing that with respect to the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed 
by Congress in September 2001, “the President should be taken to have the authority to 
interpret ambiguities as he chooses”), with Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1236 (2007) (rejecting enhanced 
judicial deference in foreign affairs in the “executive constraining zone”). 
 160. ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS WORKING GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ONLINE INVESTIGATIVE 
PRINCIPLES FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS 62 (1999) (bolding omitted). The 
guidelines note “the difficulties inherent in ascertaining physical location in an online 
environment” and instruct law enforcement agents to “seek guidance if they suspect a 
transborder issue may arise.” Id. at 63. 
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OIA161 and often require written approval before using unilateral compulsory 
measures for information located overseas.162 However, if investigators lack 
knowledge of a target’s location, they cannot effectively use these procedures.  
In the regulatory vacuum that results, rank-and-file officers have discre-
tion that may shape U.S. policy regarding which crimes trigger the use of cross-
border network investigative techniques, the breadth of hacking techniques 
that are used to effectuate remote searches, and whose property may be 
targeted. Moreover, although the ex ante warrant process regulates some 
aspects of network investigative techniques, it does so without regard to 
national security or international norms. A warrant may impose constitutional 
limitations that check the intensity and breadth of hacking techniques. But 
cross-border cyberoperations will still be unilateral, invasive, and conducted 
without coordination with the agencies that lead U.S. foreign relations and 
national security policy.  
C. The Foreign Relations Risk of Hacking the Dark Web 
Law enforcement’s use of network investigative techniques on the dark 
web is in obvious tension with international norms. It is not clear whether (and 
to what extent) a particular network investigate technique runs afoul of 
international law or how targeted states may respond. This uncertainty gives 
rise to five categories of risk: (1) the risk of attribution, (2) the risk of 
vulnerability disclosure, (3) diplomatic risks associated with unauthorized 
cross-border operations, (4) the risk of foreign prosecution targeting U.S. law 
enforcement members, and (5) the risk of countermeasures the injured state 
may be entitled to take. 
1. The risk of attribution 
The risk of attribution faced by investigators for cross-border network 
investigative techniques is heightened due to the FBI’s operational protocols 
and the public nature of the criminal justice system. For example, in a recent 
case the government was ordered to disclose information about thousands of 
 
 161. See CCIPS GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 57-58; OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-13.500 (1997) (requiring prosecutors to seek approval from 
the OIA when seeking any assistance abroad or taking “any act outside the United 
States relating to a criminal investigation or prosecution”). 
 162. See OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, supra note 161, § 9-13.525 (“[A]ll Federal prosecutors 
must obtain written approval through the Office of International Affairs (OIA) before 
issuing any subpoenas to persons or entities in the United States for records located 
abroad.”). The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and departmental policy guidance instruct 
prosecutors on when and how to make a request for approval and assistance from the 
OIA. 
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computers located in over a hundred foreign countries.163 This requirement 
conflicted with defense and intelligence policy mandating secrecy for cross-
border cyberoperations.  
This dynamic introduces an asymmetry against the United States: U.S. 
attribution of harmful attacks to states is based on circumstantial evidence that 
is typically not definitive (and thus of questionable legitimacy, particularly 
when faced with denial by the accused country), whereas attribution to the 
United States of cross-border network investigative techniques is much more 
defensible because it is more likely to be based on official documents.164  
The attribution issue was highlighted by the November 2014 breach at Sony 
Pictures Entertainment by a group calling themselves the “Guardians of 
Peace.”165 In December 2014, the FBI attributed the hack to the North Korean 
government.166 In its attribution, the FBI cited malware linked “to other 
malware that the FBI knows North Korean actors previously developed” in a 
2013 attack of South Korean banks and media outlets.167 Additionally, the 
agency noted “significant overlap between the infrastructure used in this 
attack and other malicious cyber activity the U.S. government has previously 
linked directly to North Korea.”168 However, experts critical of this attribution 
correctly note that the evidence is not definitive.169 Further fueling 
speculation, officials have not revealed specifics as to how they determined 
North Korea was responsible, likely due to the involvement of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and consequent classification of the information.170  
 
 163. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 39, United States v. Tippens,  
No. CR16-5110RJB (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016); Cox, FBI Hack, supra note 27.  
 164. Without evidence of attribution satisfying the reasonable doubt standard, for example, 
the United States would not be able to prosecute a state actor alleged to have violated 
U.S. law by hacking into a computer in the United States. 
 165. The FBI, in its investigation, noted that the breach “consisted of the deployment of 
destructive malware and the theft of proprietary information as well as employees’ 
personally identifiable information and confidential communications. The attacks also 
rendered thousands of [Sony]’s computers inoperable, forced [Sony] to take its entire 
computer network offline, and significantly disrupted the company’s business 
operations.” Press Release, FBI, Update on Sony Investigation (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  
 169. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, We Still Don’t Know Who Hacked Sony, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/we-still-dont-know 
-who-hacked-sony-north-korea/384198; see also David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, 
More Sanctions on North Korea After Sony Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1ygfN0V. 
 170. See Sanger & Schmidt, supra note 169. 
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2. The risk of vulnerability disclosure  
The use of network investigative techniques also raises national security 
risks related to the use and disclosure of software vulnerabilities. A “zero-day” 
vulnerability is a software bug for which no patch exists.171 Malicious code 
exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities can propagate from one computer to the 
next with impunity.172 Zero-day exploits are valuable because owning a zero-
day exploit, in principle, provides the capability to penetrate any device in the 
world running the affected software until the developer rolls out a software 
update that patches the security flaw.173  
Intelligence agencies, whose mandate includes protecting the nation’s 
cyberinfrastructure from attack, generally have a greater interest in 
vulnerability disclosure.174 To be sure, intelligence agencies also have an 
interest in exploiting vulnerabilities to accomplish intelligence-gathering 
objectives through cross-border hacking—which they no doubt value more 
than law enforcement interests.175 However, the intelligence community has 
 
 171. Andrea Peterson, Why Everyone Is Left Less Secure When the NSA Doesn’t Help Fix Security 
Flaws, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), http://wpo.st/sGT42. The name reflects the number 
of days such a bug has been known to the software developer. See Kim Zetter, Turns Out 
the US Launched Its Zero Day Policy in Feb 2010, WIRED (June 26, 2015, 9:48 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/06/turns-us-launched-zero-day-policy-feb-2010. See 
generally Jason Healy, The U.S. Government and Zero-Day Vulnerabilities: From Pre-
Heartbleed to Shadow Brokers, J. INT’L AFF. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/ 
online-articles/healey_vulnerability_equities_process (criticizing the FBI’s decision to 
contract with an undisclosed firm to unlock the iPhone used by San Bernardino 
shooter Syed Farook). 
 172. See Ryan Gallagher, Cyberwar’s Gray Market: Should the Secretive Hacker Zero-Day Exploit 
Market Be Regulated?, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/future_tense/2013/01/zero_day_exploits_should_the_hacker_ 
gray_market_be_regulated.html; Andy Greenberg, New Dark-Web Market Is Selling 
Zero-Day Exploits to Hackers, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2015, 6:25 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/therealdeal-zero-day-exploits; Andrea Peterson, A 
Company That Sells Hacking Tools to Governments Just Got Hacked, WASH. POST (July 6, 
2015), http://wpo.st/cQT42. 
 173. Tom Gjelten, In Cyberwar, Software Flaws Are a Hot Commodity, NPR (Feb. 12, 2013,  
3:25 AM ET), https://n.pr/WVasXe; see Vlad Tsyrklevich, Hacking Team: A Zero-Day 
Market Case Study, TSYRKLEVICH.NET (July 22, 2015), https://tsyrklevich.net/2015/ 
07/22/hacking-team-0day-market.  
 174. See Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting Vulnerabilities Will Chill 
Research, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 29, 2015), http://fw.to/sI9NwEJ; see also Jack 
Detsch, Influencers Oppose Expanding Federal Hacking Authorities, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (May 9, 2016), http://passcode.csmonitor.com/influencers-rule41 (describing 
how, in a survey of experts from across the government, the technology and security 
industry, and the privacy advocacy community, “[n]early two-thirds of Passcode’s 
Influencers said [U.S.] judges should not be able to issue search warrants for computers 
located outside their jurisdictions”). 
 175. See David E. Sanger, Obama Lets N.S.A. Exploit Some Internet Flaws, Officials Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1gmYqOm.  
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more sophisticated hacking capabilities than law enforcement and can 
therefore be much more selective about the vulnerabilities it withholds for 
intelligence gathering.176 By contrast, law enforcement agencies have an 
interest in keeping a larger pool of vulnerabilities unpatched in order to use 
hacking techniques in pursuit of criminal suspects. The conflict has played out 
before the White House Vulnerabilities Equities Process—an administrative 
proceeding before an Equities Review Board chaired by the National Security 
Council—which the FBI has been criticized for bypassing entirely.177  
The government’s use of malware also risks exposing these vulnerabilities 
to criminals or malicious state actors. When a criminal or foreign agent 
accesses a computer hacked by the United States, he may be able to reverse-
engineer the attack in order to use it to attack cyberinfrastructure in the 
United States.178 In May 2016, software maker Mozilla filed a motion asking 
the FBI to disclose a potential vulnerability in the Firefox browser that the FBI 
allegedly used to hack visitors of a child pornography site,179 “trigger[ing] a 
fierce debate around the responsibility of governments to disclosure [sic] 
vulnerabilities used in investigations to affected companies.”180 The software 
maker underscored the cybersecurity implications of the vulnerability, 
arguing in its motion to intervene that “the security of millions of individuals 
using Mozilla’s Firefox Internet browser could be put at risk by a premature 
disclosure of this vulnerability.”181  
In a recent case the government was ordered to disclose its hacking tools’ 
source code to the defense, but its compliance with the order was blocked by 
the FBI, which asserted that disclosure of the vulnerability information would 
 
 176. See id.  
 177. See Healy, supra note 171. 
 178. Amy Zegart, Vladimir Putin Is Trying to Hack the Election: What Should US Do?, CNN 
(Oct. 24, 2016, 12:18 PM ET), http://cnn.it/2exPWwu (“Many cyber weapons have a 
‘use it and lose it’ quality. Once they are in the wild, they can be reverse engineered and 
possibly used against us.”). 
 179. Mozilla’s Motion to Intervene or Appear as Amicus Curiae in Relation to 
Government’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Order on the Third Motion to 
Compel at 1-2, United States v. Michaud, No. 15-CR-05351-RJB (W.D. Wash. May 11, 
2016) [hereinafter Mozilla’s Motion to Intervene]; Joseph Cox, Mozilla Urges FBI to 
Disclose Potential Firefox Security Vulnerability, MOTHERBOARD (May 12, 2016, 12:26 AM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/mozilla-urges-fbi-to-disclose-firefox-security 
-vulnerability. 
 180. Cox, supra note 179. 
 181. Mozilla’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 179, at 1-2 (“To protect the safety of Firefox 
users, and the integrity of the systems and networks that rely on Firefox, Mozilla 
requests that the Court order that the Government disclose the exploit to Mozilla at 
least 14 days before any disclosure to the Defendant, so Mozilla can analyze the 
vulnerability, create a fix, and update its products before the vulnerability can be used 
to compromise the security of its users’ systems by nefarious actors.”). 
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have subjected the United States to national security risk.182 At least one court 
has found that the refusal to disclose an exploit to the defense requires the 
suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the technique.183 
3. The risk to diplomatic legitimacy 
The United States has an interest in taking a leadership role in norm 
development in cyberspace.184 Harmonization between states is facilitated 
through diplomacy.185 Hard diplomacy is the negotiation of treaties and other 
formal agreements.186 It functions through formal, traditional channels of 
negotiation between the officials of two or more states or through an 
international organization like the United Nations. Soft diplomacy relies on 
indirect influence through interactions with civilians and government 
actors.187 According to Joseph Nye, a state’s soft power turns on “its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to 
 
 182. See Charlie Osborne, FBI Refuses to Release Tor Exploit Details, Evidence Thrown out of 
Court, ZDNET (May 26, 2016, 9:55 GMT), http://zd.net/1sc15XX (“There are 1,200 cases 
pending against alleged visitors to the website and the formal refusal of evidence 
gained by tracking these visitors could destroy the FBI’s hopes of winning these cases. 
Without being able to submit evidence that each defendant viewed or downloaded 
child abuse images, many—if not all—of these cases are at risk of collapse.”). 
 183. See Order Denying Dismissal & Excluding Evidence at 1, Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351-
RJB (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016); see also Osborne, supra note 182. 
 184. The Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace states:  
Given the dynamism of cyberspace, nations must work together to defend their com-
mon interests and promote security. DoD’s relationship with U.S. allies and international 
partners provides a strong foundation upon which to further U.S. international cyberspace 
cooperation. Continued international engagement, collective self-defense, and the establish-
ment of international cyberspace norms will also serve to strengthen cyberspace for the 
benefit of all. 
  U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 2 
(2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/DOD-Strategy-for 
-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf. 
 185. See Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 135, 146 (2000) (“When regulatory conflict and regulatory spillover occur with 
respect to ‘real-space’ transnational transactions, nations have responded with a variety 
of international harmonization strategies.”). 
 186. See id. (“Sometimes harmonization takes the ‘hard’ form of treaties that either establish 
a uniform international standard, or an international anti-discrimination regime, or an 
international choice-of-law regime. Other times harmonization takes ‘softer’ forms 
like information sharing among enforcement agencies or informally agreed-upon 
regulatory targets.”).  
 187. Cf. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 83 (2011) (noting the difficulties of 
incorporating soft power into a government’s strategy because its instruments “are not 
fully under the control of governments,” its outcomes are more in the control of the 
targeted state rather than the initiating state, and the results take a long time). 
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them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as 
legitimate and having moral authority).”188  
Soft power is particularly useful in the cyberspace context because of 
attribution and enforcement difficulties. Therefore, the public scope and 
nature of cross-border cyberoperations may have heightened foreign policy 
consequences. This is where leading by example comes into play.189 As Harold 
Koh has argued, the “process of visibly obeying international norms builds U.S. 
‘soft power,’ enhances its moral authority, and strengthens U.S. capacity for 
global leadership.”190 It follows that the extent of the visible violations of our 
obligations to other nations—and our interpretation of those obligations—
signals to the international community the United States’ position as to what 
the existing norms permit and, more broadly, sends a significant message as to 
the United States’ position on the rule of law. 
The United States has taken the position that applying existing interna-
tional norms to cyberspace is merely a matter of “applying old questions to the 
latest developments in technology.”191 Where there are many gaps in the 
application of existing law to new technologies,192 the United States may have 
an interest in nudging norm development one way or another.193 Yet the 
 
 188. Id. at 84. 
 189. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Mutuality also serves to inculcate the values of law and order. By respecting the 
rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other nations to respect the rights of our 
citizens. Moreover, as our Nation becomes increasingly concerned about the domestic 
effects of international crime, we cannot forget that the behavior of our law enforce-
ment agents abroad sends a powerful message about the rule of law to individuals 
everywhere.”).  
 190. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003); see 
id. at 1480 n.2 (“Soft power rests on the ability to set the agenda in a way that shapes the 
preferences of others. . . . If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to 
force you to do what you do not want to do. If the United States represents values that 
others want to follow, it will cost us less to lead.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY 
SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 9 (2002))). 
 191. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, Remarks to the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
ONLINE 1, 8 (2012). 
 192. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 335-52 (2015) 
(explaining the limitations of analogizing cyberspace to the high seas, outer space, or 
Antarctica for the purpose of applying existing legal norms). 
 193. See Henry Farrell, Council on Foreign Relations, Promoting Norms for Cyberspace 1 
(2015), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Norms_CyberBrief.pdf; 
James Andrew Lewis, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, Liberty, Equality, Connectivity: 
Transatlantic Cybersecurity Norms 1 (2014), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140225_Lewis_TransatlanticCybersecurity 
Norms.pdf (“Europe and the United States have a collective interest in the promotion 
of a stable international order based on the rule of law, open and equitable arrange-
footnote continued on next page 
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United States has not articulated—explicitly or implicitly through state 
practice—an intelligible principle that distinguishes one form of cross-border 
cyberexfiltration operation targeting persons or firms from the next. In this 
context, the use of network investigative techniques will no doubt draw 
criticism about the legitimacy of U.S. policy positions194 and affect 
international efforts to regulate cyberoperations, all of which are still at an 
embryonic stage.195  
By allowing rank-and-file officials to control how hacking warrants are 
executed, the existing legal process effectively allows the circumstances of the 
immediate investigation to dictate foreign policy interests in cultivating soft 
power. Decisionmaking at the rank-and-file level is driven by the immediate 
goals of a domestic criminal investigation as opposed to broader, more 
complex foreign policy goals. Primary decisionmaking lacks meaningful 
interagency coordination and is enforced by a judiciary whose umpiring 
capabilities are limited to preserving individual rights in the domestic sphere 
and who lack technological expertise to spot irregularities.196  
 
ments for trade, and a commitment to democratic government and individual rights.”); 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-606, UNITED STATES FACES 
CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE 1, 30, 39 (2010) 
(finding that the “global aspects of cyberspace present key challenges to U.S. policy”—
including challenges to the United States’ ability to assert leadership in norm develop-
ment, conduct interagency coordination, and pursue a consistent national strategy—
and arguing that “the United States will be at a disadvantage in promoting its national 
interests in the realm of cyberspace” until those challenges are addressed).  
 194. See David E. Sanger, Fine Line Seen in U.S. Spying on Companies, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 
2014), http://nyti.ms/1j6nJVq (“China demands that the U.S. give it a clear explanation 
of its cybertheft, bugging and monitoring activities, and immediately stop such  
activity . . . .” (quoting statement from the Chinese Defense Ministry)); see also Jack 
Goldsmith, The U.S. Corporate Theft Principle, LAWFARE (May 21, 2014, 8:07 AM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/05/the-u-s-corporate-theft-principle (“What the 
United States needs is an explanation convincing to audiences outside the United States 
about why its principle of corporate espionage is attractive beyond its furtherance of 
U.S. corporate and national security interests.”).  
 195. For example, China suspended its participation in a U.S.-China working group on 
cybersecurity just after the May 2014 indictments. Ting Shi & Michael Riley, China 
Halts Cybersecurity Cooperation After U.S. Spying Charges, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2014,  
2:39 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-20/china-suspends 
-cybersecurity-cooperation-with-u-s-after-charges.html; see Sanger, supra note 194.  
 196. According to one former magistrate, “judges who allow technological advances to pass 
them by aren’t doing the public any favors by not staying current. Law enforcement 
has moved on, and it’s tough to act as a check against overreach if you don’t understand 
the subject matter.” See Tim Cushing, Judge John Facciola on Today’s Law Enforcement: I’d 
Go Weeks Without Seeing a Warrant for Anything ‘Tactile,’ TECHDIRT (Mar. 3, 2015,  
2:34 PM), https://tdrt.io/exi. And while “agents can describe the process more fully to a 
judge in closed chambers,” this does not occur unless “the judge knows to ask.” Ellen 
Nakashima, Meet the Woman in Charge of the FBI’s Most Controversial High-Tech Tools, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), http://wpo.st/F2022 (attributing the statement to Amy Hess, 
footnote continued on next page 
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4. The risk of foreign prosecution  
Most, if not all, network investigative techniques that target foreign 
computers will violate foreign domestic law, just as foreign-launched 
cyberexfiltration operations would violate U.S. law,197 notwithstanding a 
purported law enforcement purpose.198 After all, a cyberexfiltration operation 
originating in the United States that targets a computer in another state is 
subject to the prescriptive jurisdiction of that state.199 In 2002, for example, 
Russia’s Federal Security Service filed criminal charges against FBI agents for 
remotely accessing and extracting data from servers in Chelyabinsk, Russia in 
order to seize evidence that was later used in a criminal trial.200 The incident 
was reportedly “the first FBI case to ever utilize the technique of extra-
territorial seizure of digital evidence.”201 The practice largely went 
underground after this incident, in part “to keep public references to [the FBI’s] 
online surveillance tools to a minimum.”202 The United States, too, has 
prosecuted foreign state actors for hacking into computers and extracting 
information. More recently, the DOJ indicted five members of the Chinese 
military for cyberespionage.203 The fact that the defendants were likely 
enforcing Chinese law does not change the fact that their actions violated U.S. 
law. 
 
the head of the FBI’s Operational Technology Division, which is responsible for 
developing and executing the FBI’s network investigative techniques, and noting that 
judges may not really understand what they are authorizing if warrants do not describe 
techniques in sufficient detail).  
 197. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] was originally designed to target hackers who 
accessed computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer functionali-
ty, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to ‘access and control high technolo-
gy processes vital to our everyday lives. . . .’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9 (1984))). 
 198. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (“‘[T]he fact that conduct 
is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the 
United States[’] . . . laws,’ even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or 
encourage such conduct.” (first alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 
1987))). 
 199. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
 200. Brunker, supra note 42; see United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 
1024026 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001). 
 201. Robert Lemos, Russia Accuses FBI Agent of Hacking, CNET (Aug. 19, 2002, 5:05 AM PDT) 
(quoting FBI press release), http://cnet.co/2lRHM6r.  
 202. See Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 18 (attributing the statement to former U.S. 
officials). 
 203. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 42. 
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The DOJ recognizes that cross-border network investigative techniques 
threaten the sovereignty of other nations. DOJ guidelines for online 
investigations warn investigators that accessing remotely stored data, or even 
initiating “personal contact with residents of a foreign state, may violate 
foreign law. In addition, activity by U.S. law enforcement in such areas may be 
regarded as a violation of the other nation’s sovereignty, creating the potential 
for serious diplomatic conflict.”204 The Office of the U.S. Attorneys’ Criminal 
Resource Manual cautions that another “nation may regard an effort by an 
American investigator or prosecutor to investigate a crime or gather evidence 
within its borders as a violation of sovereignty,” including even “seemingly 
innocuous acts as a telephone call[] [or] a letter.”205 
5. The risk of countermeasures 
Affected states that perceive the use of cross-border network investigative 
techniques as a violation of the United States’ international law obligations 
may seek “self-help” in the form of countermeasures.206 Countermeasures are 
“State actions, or omissions, directed at another State that would otherwise 
violate an obligation owed to that State.”207 Countermeasures must be 
proportionate to the harm suffered and necessary to compel or convince the 
violating state to “desist in its own internationally wrongful acts or 
omissions.”208  
An injured state’s right to take countermeasures is triggered by the 
discovery of a violation of an international norm or treaty obligation 
 
 204. ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS WORKING GRP., supra note 160, at 16; see also CCIPS 
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 58 (noting that “issues such as sovereignty and comity 
may be implicated” in the event investigators access “a computer located in another 
country” without permission). 
 205. OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 267 (1997). 
 206. See Hathaway et al., supra note 41, at 857; Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber 
Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 
697, 699 (2014) (detailing how the law of countermeasures applies to cross-border 
cyberoperations); see also Katharine C. Hinkle, Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One 
More Thing to Worry About, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 11, 12 (2011) (“‘[R]eciprocal 
countermeasures’—which have been cited by the U.S. Department of Defense and 
several scholars as being an effective and even preferable mode of self-help in the cyber 
context—are deeply problematic for an international legal regime that seeks to 
appropriately constrain state responses to cyber-conflict.” (footnote omitted)). 
 207. Schmitt, supra note 206, at 700. The Draft Articles of State Responsibility codify when 
and how a state is held responsible for a breach of an international obligation and how 
a state may respond to international law violations that fall below the threshold of an 
armed attack or a prohibited use of force. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of 
Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 56-57 (2001). 
 208. Schmitt, supra note 206, at 700. 
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attributable to a particular state.209 Once these requirements are met, the 
principle of proportionality plays a central role in “modulating the escalation 
of conflict between states.”210 In the cyber context, “[t]erritorial sovereignty 
protects cyber infrastructure located on a State’s territory, regardless of its 
governmental character, or lack thereof,”211 and it may be violated “even when 
no damage results, as in the case of emplacement of malware designed to 
monitor a system’s activities.”212  
As noted, it is well established that direct exercise of one state’s law 
enforcement functions in the territory of another state requires that state’s 
consent.213 States that attribute cross-border network investigative techniques 
to the United States may have a defensible claim that the United States violated 
customary international law’s prohibition on the extraterritorial exercise of 
law enforcement functions without consent214 as well as the concomitant 
principle of nonintervention, which “forbids all States or groups of States to 
intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other 
States.”215 This is particularly the case for attributed law enforcement hacking 
 
 209. Hinkle, supra note 206, at 16 (“The threshold inquiry for evaluating the legality of 
countermeasures asks whether there has been (1) an internationally wrongful act that 
(2) is attributable to another state.”). 
 210. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 715, 718 (2008); see Hinkle, supra note 206, at 18-20. 
 211. Schmitt, supra note 206, at 704. 
 212. Id. at 705 (distinguishing such activities from mere espionage or “monitoring,” which 
are permitted); see also Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational 
Evidence Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 347, 352 (2002) (arguing that direct access of foreign-located data “cannot 
provide the conceptual basis for approaching the legal issues involved in transborder 
searches and seizures because it would inevitably allow the victim state to transgress 
upon another state’s sovereignty by searching and seizing property belonging to that 
state’s citizens, property that is physically located within that state’s territorial 
boundaries”). 
 213. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Stephan Wilske & Teresa 
Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 
FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 171 (1997) (“Enforcement measures requiring consent include not 
only the physical arrest of a person, but also, for example, service of subpoena, orders 
for production of documents, and police inquiries.”). 
 214. See Bellia, supra note 35, at 77 n.143 (concluding that cross-border cyberexfiltration 
operations violate customary international law based on “the notion that a foreign 
country’s manipulation of data is akin to a trespass and to interference with protected 
privacy interests”). But see Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote 
Cross-Border Searches, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 108 (arguing that logging on to a remote 
server after lawfully acquiring a target’s password credentials is territorially “ambigu-
ous” and may therefore be in compliance with customary international law). 
 215. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205, at 107-08 (June 27); see Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 
Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (Apr. 9). 
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operations that move forward with a search after the initial intrusion despite 
learning that the target is located overseas. Interference with property interests 
distinguishes network investigative techniques from other forms of espionage, 
such as the use of spy satellites, where State A’s personnel and instruments are 
anchored in a jurisdictionally neutral territory (for example, outer space) and 
therefore do not violate the territorial integrity of State B.216 
A review of applicable treaties and diplomatic communications reveals 
that no state has consented to the United States’ launch of cross-border 
network investigative techniques. In fact, the only multilateral agreement to 
address the issue of law enforcement “remote access” directly—the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention)—explicitly 
refused to authorize remote cross-border searches.217 As Oona Hathaway 
noted, the Budapest Convention may “limit the extent to which parties to the 
Convention could conduct cyber-attacks against other state parties, since that 
would undermine the overall intent of the agreement.”218 In 1995, Council of 
Europe ministers tasked with considering the legal implications of cross-
border network investigative techniques recommended against the practice.219 
Experts commissioned in 2009 by the Council of Europe’s Project on 
Cybercrime explained:  
The Recommendation reflects the common understanding of the drafters that 
investigative activity of law enforcement authorities of a State Party in interna-
tional communication networks or in computer systems located in the territory 
of another state may amount to a violation of territorial sovereignty of the state 
 
 216. See Bellia, supra note 35, at 77 n.143 (“[I]nterference with property interests—as well as 
personal privacy interests—distinguishes a remote cross-border search from other 
activities, such as the use of satellites for remote sensing related to management of 
natural resources and environmental protection, that are not thought to violate 
international law.”). 
 217. See Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2004, S. TREATY DOC.  
NO. 108-11 (2006), 2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force July 1, 2004) [hereinafter 
Budapest Convention]. The Budapest Convention was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 
September 2006. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, COUNCIL EUR., 
https://go.coe.int/Be71y (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 218. Hathaway et al., supra note 41, at 864. 
 219. Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., Recommendation No. R (95) 13 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedural Law 
Connected with Information Technology (1995), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublic 
CommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804f6e76. 
Duncan Hollis has argued that the Budapest Convention’s drafters may have purpose-
fully left open provisions concerning cyberattacks by law enforcement. See Duncan B. 
Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1052 (2007). 
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concerned, and therefore cannot be undertaken without prior consent of the State 
concerned.220 
The use of countermeasures to respond to a cyberattack is illustrated by 
the U.S. response to North Korea’s hack of Sony. After the attacks on Sony, 
President Obama made a public statement that the United States would 
“respond proportionately” to the incident, calling it an act of cybervandal-
ism.221 Just days later, the North Korean Internet experienced outages for 
about ten hours.222 Many, including North Korea, speculated that the United 
States was behind a hack that resulted in the outages.223 That day, Marie Harf, a 
State Department spokeswoman, told reporters, “We aren’t going to [publicly] 
discuss . . . operational details about the possible response options. . . . [A]s we 
implement our responses, some will be seen, some may not be seen.”224 
Further complicating the matter is the lack of consensus among states as to 
how to classify cross-border cyberoperations. As Matthew Waxman notes, “[i]t 
is widely believed that sophisticated cyber attacks could cause massive harm—
whether to military capabilities, economic and financial systems, or social 
functioning—because of modern reliance on system interconnectivity.”225 And 
because states differ in how they interpret the application of international 
norms to harmful cyberoperations, “there is a range of reasonable interpreta-
 
 220. See Henrik W.K. Kaspersen, Cybercrime and Internet Jurisdiction 26 (2009), 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?doc
umentId=09000016803042b7 (explaining that the use of processing capacity or data 
stored on computer systems in a state encroaches on that state’s territorial sovereignty, 
despite uncertainty as to whether cross-border activity in the form of mere communi-
cation, such as via telephone, violates territorial sovereignty). In light of this concern, 
the Convention’s drafters agreed to allow direct unilateral cross-border access to data 
only when those data were generally accessible or when explicit consent was obtained 
from the data’s owner or custodian. See Budapest Convention, supra note 217, art. 32. In 
this sense, article 32 is “a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a 
convention.” See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 
(Sept. 7). 
 221. David Jackson, Obama: We’re Not at Cyberwar with North Korea, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 
2014, 1:17 PM EST), http://usat.ly/16FuBL2. 
 222. See Brian Fung, North Korea’s Internet Outage Was Likely the Work of Hacktivists—But Not 
the Ones You Might Think, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), https://wpo.st/6dwd2. 
 223. See Jack Kim, North Korea Blames U.S. for Internet Outages, Calls Obama “Monkey,” 
REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:40 AM EST), http://reut.rs/1EwYeNF; see also Ashley 
Feinberg, So Who Shut Down North Korea’s Internet?, GIZMODO (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:50 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/so-who-shut-down-north-koreas-internet-1674589139. 
 224. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, North Korea Loses Its Link to the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1ARmSCL. A week later the United States placed 
sanctions on three organizations and ten individuals associated with the North Korean 
government. See Sony Cyber Attack: North Korea Calls US Sanctions Hostile, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30670884.  
 225. Matthew C. Waxman, Self-Defensive Force Against Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic and 
Political Dimensions, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 109, 109 (2013). 
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tions of cyber ‘armed attacks’ for the purposes of triggering militarily forceful 
self-defense, and a stable consensus is unlikely for the foreseeable future.”226  
The U.S. position on the use of force in cyberspace incorporates the “scale 
and effects” test, which focuses on the consequences of a cyberoperation.227 
While this is the most widely held view,228 a competing position turns on the 
status of the target and privileges “critical infrastructure” with special 
protected status.229 Yet another position turns on the “instrumentality theory,” 
where “[t]he more analogous a new weapon is to conventional forms of 
military force, the more likely its operation will constitute a ‘use of force’ or 
‘armed attack.’”230  
According to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
experts agree that gaining access to a target for intelligence collection is tanta-
mount to gaining the ability to attack that target. If a penetration were detected, 
 
 226. Id. at 120-21. Testifying before the Senate Committee considering his nomination to 
lead the NSA and United States Cyber Command, Michael Rogers explained:  
As a matter of law, DoD believes that what constitutes a use of force in cyberspace is the 
same for all nations, and that our activities in cyberspace would be governed by Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter the same way that other nations would be. With that said, there is no 
international consensus on the precise definition of a use of force, in or out of cyberspace. 
Thus, it is likely that other nations will assert and apply different definitions and thresholds 
for what constitutes a use a [sic] force in cyberspace, and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.  
Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN: Nominee for Com-
mander, United States Cyber Command 11-12 (2014) [hereinafter Advance Questions], 
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_03-11-14.pdf. For an 
extensive discussion of the debate surrounding the definition of “force” and “armed 
attack” in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter, see generally Waxman, supra  
note 41, at 431-37. 
 227. As Michael Rogers explained:  
DoD has a set of criteria that it uses to assess cyberspace events. As individual events may 
vary greatly from each other, each event will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. While the 
criteria we use to assess events are classified for operational security purposes, generally 
speaking, DoD analyzes whether the proximate consequences of a cyberspace event are similar 
to those produced by kinetic weapons. 
Advance Questions, supra note 226, at 11. 
 228. See Hathaway et al., supra note 41, at 847 (“Steering a middle course between the 
instrument- and target-based views, the effects-based approach is the most promising 
and most widely accepted approach.”). 
 229. One problem with this “target-based” approach is that states define “critical 
infrastructure” in different ways. See TENACE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: 
THREATS, ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 5-8 (2014), http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/ 
~tenace/download/deliverable/Report_tenace.pdf (distinguishing between definitions 
in the European Union and in the United States); cf. Waxman, supra note 41, at 436 
(discussing the target-based approach). 
 230. Reese Nguyen, Comment, Navigating Jus ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1079, 1117 (2013). 
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the victim may not know whether the purpose of the activity would be limited to 
espionage only, or would also constitute preparation for an attack.231  
This, coupled with the doctrinal uncertainties described above, may increase 
the risk of escalation by victim states under the purported justification of 
anticipatory self-defense, upon a (mistaken, though defensible) fear of an attack 
in the proximate future. It is for this reason that when Rogers was asked if 
there were classes of overseas targets that should be “‘off-limits’ from 
penetration through cyberspace,”232 he explained that “the U.S. Government 
should only conduct cyberspace operations against carefully selected foreign 
targets that are critical to addressing explicitly stated intelligence and military 
requirements, as approved by national policymakers and the national 
command authority.”233  
This appears to directly clash with the use of cyberoperations to collect 
evidence in pursuit of a criminal actor. Consider a case from 2012 in which an 
FBI agent applied for and received a warrant to use network investigative 
techniques to target a suspect believed to be a member of the Iranian military 
located in Iranian territory.234 Due to a software malfunction, “the program 
hidden in the link sent to [the target] never actually executed.”235 But what if 
the malfunction caused harm to the target computer? Or worse, what if the 
program executed successfully but allowed the Iranians to match its 
forensically obtained digital signature to malware used in other, more hostile 
attacks that were then attributed to the United States? In either case, it would be 
defensible for an adversary state to respond. 
The inherent unreliability of malware adds to the risk of escalation. 
Malware functionality is inherently buggy, and malfunction may lead to 
harmful, irreversible consequences and collateral damage associated with its 
 
 231. See Advance Questions, supra note 226, at 12 (bolding omitted). 
 232. Id. at 13 (bolding omitted). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 18 (noting that a photo e-mailed by the suspect to 
investigators “appeared to show an olive-skinned man in his late 20s, wearing what 
court documents described as an ‘Iranian tan camouflaged military uniform,’” and that 
the IP address used to register the e-mail address years prior suggested he was in 
Tehran, Iran). The suspect “allegedly threatened to detonate bombs at a county jail, a 
DoubleTree hotel, the University of Denver, the University of Texas, San Antonio 
International Airport, Washington-Dulles International Airport, Virginia Common-
wealth University and other heavily used public facilities across the country.” Id. The 
investigators executing the warrant used a spear phishing technique and sent an e-mail 
containing a link that, when clicked, would cause surveillance software to be 
downloaded on the target machine. Id.; see supra note 108 and accompanying text 
(describing spear phishing techniques).  
 235. See Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 18 (quoting a handwritten note from the FBI 
agent to the court). 
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use.236 For example, “[p]oorly designed malware could cause the destruction of 
data or the corruption of the whole operating system.”237 This is only 
exacerbated by the Internet of Things phenomenon and the potential security 
risks of using interconnected devices such as smart light bulbs, connected cars, 
smart fridges, wearables, and other home security systems.238 The FBI 
highlighted this very issue in a 2015 public service announcement about the 
safety risks associated with the Internet of Things, warning that lack of 
consumer awareness as to the threat exposure may allow attackers to execute 
online attacks, resulting in a number of risks, including physical harm to 
consumers.239 
III. Toward a Normative Legal Process 
With the advent of network investigative techniques on the dark web, it 
has become clear that the criminal legal process should be adjusted to ensure 
that it better regulates government conduct that has an impact on U.S. foreign 
relations or national security. Rather than wait for political fallout as a 
precondition for government intervention,240 a more forward-looking 
approach would reallocate decisionmaking authority to institutions better 
suited to identify and balance foreign relations risks against the law 
enforcement benefits of using cross-border network investigative tech-
niques.241  
This raises three fundamental regulatory questions: First, which institu-
tions should set these preferences and calibrate them as the government moves 
forward within a complex and unpredictable global cybersecurity land-
 
 236. RONALD J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE FOR CYBERSPACE 25, 31-32 (2013); 
Mark Mekow & Lakshmikanth Raghavan, Security Testing of Custom Software 
Applications, CSO (July 28, 2010, 8:00 AM PT), http://www.csoonline.com/article/ 
2125378/application-security/security-testing-of-custom-software-applications.html; 
Quinn Norton, Everything Is Broken, MEDIUM: MESSAGE (May 20, 2014), 
https://medium.com/message/everything-is-broken-81e5f33a24e1#.oc3f76k26. 
 237. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44547, DIGITAL SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES: OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 41 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 9 (2016). 
 238. See Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION 
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.ic3.gov/media/2015/150910.aspx. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 30-34 (1994) (noting that law and economics analysis 
tends to precondition government intervention on regulatory failure to satisfy 
efficiency benchmarks). 
 241. See Rubin, supra note 49, at 469 (“A more comprehensive institutional comparison 
might consider other goals . . . .”). 
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scape?242 Second, what policy preferences can be set (using direct and indirect 
government intervention) to mitigate the immediate risks caused by the failure 
of the existing rules? Third, how should the policy preferences be implemented 
and enforced, considering the comparative institutional failures of the existing 
system?243  
This Part begins to answer these questions and in doing so outlines a 
preliminary legal process for managing network investigative techniques. 
First, it conducts a comparative institutional analysis and concludes that the 
executive branch is best suited to assume primary responsibility for future 
government hacking policy. It proposes an interagency conflict resolution 
scheme to ensure law enforcement hacking policy decisions do not offend 
foreign relations or national security interests. Second, it sets out baseline 
policy preferences that constrict the scope of hacking power delegated to the 
rank-and-file officers executing this new surveillance technique. Third, it lays 
out a regulatory scheme for implementation and enforcement that involves “a 
complex, dynamic interaction of institutions that simultaneously work 
together, challenge each other, defend themselves and divide responsibility.”244 
The objective is to enhance the ability to produce decision rules that are 
predictably and objectively applied, democratically legitimate, and in the 
overall public interest.245 
A. Failure of the Existing Legal Process 
To be sure, responsibility for the existing system’s failure does not lie with 
institution-wide incompetence on the part of the executive branch with respect 
to foreign relations. The existing system fails because it authorizes rank-and-
file officials to make decisions that have direct foreign policy implications 
 
 242. Stated another way, which institutions should set rules that balance law enforcement 
interests against countervailing foreign relations interests? See id. at 469 & n.25 (“Law 
and economics has framed the regulatory debate as an institutional comparison; the 
operative question is not how well the market functions, but whether the regulatory 
system could produce a better outcome.” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977))).  
 243. See Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 297 (2011) (calling 
these “second-order” design choices for enforcing “first-order” preferences). 
 244. Rubin, supra note 49, at 467; see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) 
[hereinafter Rubin, New Legal Process]; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the 
New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 952 n.177 (1989) (book review) (arguing that 
“[t]he core insight of legal process is that [policy solutions] will emerge from the 
synergies associated with the process itself” rather than from substantive law). 
 245. See Rubin, New Legal Process, supra note 244, at 1414-16 (calling these the most accepted 
goals for rules). 
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without meaningful guidance or oversight.246 This Subpart articulates an 
executive interagency decisionmaking framework that maximizes 
information, expertise, coordination, and the ability to make decisions on the 
fly. 
As noted, courts are constrained by the territoriality of warrant authori-
ty,247 broad deference to law enforcement on investigatory matters,248 and 
broad deference to the executive branch on matters of foreign policy,249 
particularly in the face of statutory silence or ambiguity.250 In addition, 
magistrate judges lack subject matter expertise regarding complex computer 
science questions and are therefore ill equipped to scrutinize search warrant 
applications that involve such technologies.251  
The gap between DOJ policy and DOJ action may also suggest that rank-
and-file officers, as opposed to the overarching executive branch, lack subject 
matter expertise in computer network security and international cyberspace 
law.252 Stated another way, rank-and-file officers may not be properly 
implementing current executive branch policy for cross-border searches 
because they lack the requisite expertise to realize current policy is applicable 
in the first place. 
 
 246. See supra Part II.B. 
 247. See supra Part II.A. 
 248. Cf. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776 (2012) (noting 
that courts are deferential to law enforcement in part because they recognize their own 
limited institutional competence). But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”). 
 249. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 651 
(2000) (“Courts have given deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs matters 
throughout the nation’s history . . . .”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) 
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1337 
(1988) (“The courts have too readily read [United States v.] Curtiss-Wright [Exp. Corp., 
299 U.S. 304 (1936),] as standing for the proposition that the Executive deserves an 
extra, and often dispositive, measure of deference in foreign affairs above and beyond 
that necessary to preserve the smooth functioning of the national government.” (italics 
omitted)). 
 250. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
Scholars disagree regarding the extent of the deference owed the executive branch in 
the context of ambiguous statutory authority, but there is no disagreement that some 
deference is required. See supra note 159. 
 251. See supra note 196.  
 252. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1411-12 
(2009) (“Superior access to information or expertise contributes nothing to accuracy, 
after all, unless the decisionmaker actually exploits them, and does so reliably.”); see also 
id. at 1411 n.168 (citing RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 217 (1998) (arguing that 
institutional expertise should be given less weight where the officials “did not actually 
investigate despite their capacity to do so”)). 
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The executive branch—as a whole—has a comparative institutional 
advantage over Congress and the federal courts in terms of making foreign 
policy decisions that turn on rapidly changing technologies. Executive agencies 
such as the DOJ, the State Department, and the NSA arguably have superior 
systematic access to information and expertise on both foreign relations and 
technology—whether through their own subject matter experts253 or access to 
other executive agencies that specialize in foreign policy, intelligence 
gathering, and technology capabilities.254 By pooling administrative resources, 
the executive can configure a policymaking team that brings together 
information and expertise related to foreign relations, law enforcement, 
technology, and cybersecurity.255 
An executive agency implementation scheme also has the advantage of 
being able to adapt in response to rapidly changing technologies and the 
uncertainties of international norm development. By using executive 
instruments to set substantive policy preferences, there is minimal cost of 
changing policy, facilitating a dynamic, nimble policy regime.256 For example, 
the DOJ can more easily centralize on-the-fly decisionmaking and provide 
notice through the rulemaking process and a variety of other administrative 
 
 253. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for 
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 160 (1998) (“It seems clear that the political 
branches are institutionally better equipped than courts to reach agreement with other 
nations about how international business should be regulated.”); Koh, supra note 249, at 
1336 (noting courts’ lack of expertise and suggesting structural solutions, including 
centralization of the adjudication of national security claims in a particular court such 
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit); Julian Ku & John 
Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the 
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 199-201 (2006) (describing how the 
executive branch’s institutional competence in foreign relations is superior to that of 
the judiciary); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of 
Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269, 280-83 (2012). 
 254. Cf. Ku & Yoo, supra note 253, at 195-201 (“[C]ourts have access to limited information in 
foreign affairs cases . . . .”). 
 255. The team should include the Cyber Coordinator, the NSA’s representative for the 
vulnerability equities process, and representatives from the DOJ’s CCIPS and OIA. 
 256. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) (“And in contrast to the doubters of 
the unitary executive, I believe a unitary executive serves important values, particular-
ly in times of crisis. Speed and dispatch are often virtues to be celebrated.”); see also 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-46 (2001). 
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mechanisms.257 The DOJ also has the capacity to generate uniform rules “and 
to publicize those rules as binding upon the entire nation.”258 
By contrast, Congress and the courts tend to be sluggish or nonuniform in 
their decisionmaking.259 The courts can examine changing issues on a case-by-
case basis, but their system of precedent and jurisdictional limitation slows the 
generation of decision rules that have a uniform national application. And 
while Congress is able to promulgate laws uniformly, it has not passed a 
comprehensive electronic surveillance law in over thirty years.260  
On the other hand, when an institution “makes a major policy move on its 
own” without sufficient basis in legislative authorization, as it seems the DOJ 
has done with network investigation techniques, “it undercuts the democratic 
legitimacy of statutes.”261 The use of cross-border network investigative 
techniques undercuts the DOJ’s democratic legitimacy to the extent it requires 
an interpretation of its statutory investigative authority to extend overseas, 
allowing rank-and-file officials to conduct cross-border investigative activities 
in violation of customary international law, without more explicit 
authorization from Congress.262  
Thus, if the executive were to allot broad discretion to rank-and-file 
officials to shape foreign policy as a matter of course in the execution of search 
warrants, it would be more consistent with democratic goals to pass the policy 
 
 257. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 411, 419 (“[A]gencies have a variety of mechanisms that allow them to generate 
national rules relatively quickly: administrative rulemaking, published guidances, 
handbooks, and even online websites.”). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (arguing that case-by-case adjudication is slow); David Alan Sklansky, Two More 
Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 227 
(2015) (“And while statutes theoretically can be revised at any time, without waiting for 
the proper case to arise and without regard for precedent, in practice Congress is often 
notoriously sluggish.”). 
 260. Cf. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2015)).  
 261. See Eskridge, supra note 257, at 436. 
 262. Such an interpretation of statutory authority runs against the executive’s own 
interpretation of FBI authority to override customary international law in extraterrito-
rial law enforcement activities. That interpretation requires “direction of the President 
or the Attorney General” for the FBI to “use its statutory authority” to “investigate and 
arrest individuals for violations of applicable United States law” if “those actions depart 
from customary international law.” Auth. of the FBI to Override Int’l Law in Extrater-
ritorial Law Enf’t Activities, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 183 (1989). But cf. Extraterritorial 
Apprehension by the FBI, 4B Op. O.L.C. 543 (1980) (finding no authority for the FBI to 
conduct cross-border abductions of noncitizens in violation of customary international 
law). 
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modification through Congress before it became law.263 Instead, the executive 
should adopt the narrower scope of baseline law enforcement hacking 
capabilities articulated in Part III.B below, which constrain the broad hacking 
powers the FBI currently has without undermining immediate investigatory 
goals. 
Expansion of law enforcement hacking powers from the baseline prefer-
ences should balance law enforcement interests with competing foreign 
relations and national security interests. One way to do this might be to 
characterize the problem as a horizontal agency conflict between the DOJ, the 
NSA, and the State Department. Notwithstanding details of the institutional 
design solution, the resolution of this conflict should ideally “take advantage of 
the ability of adversarial relationships to foster fuller development of 
information and debate, along with broader representation for conflicting 
interests.”264 To that end, it should entail three things: First, it should balance 
interests and resolve the conflict. Second, it must generate and promulgate two 
types of information: (a) information about each agency’s policies and  
(b) information about technical facts. Third, it must generate a record of this 
information. 
That being the case, there are several mechanisms the executive can use.265 
The President can, for example, direct the agencies to negotiate a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) on interagency protocols that the FBI must 
follow (for example, decisions must be made under the advisement of the 
President).266 The President can, alternatively, create an interagency task force 
that makes recommendations on law enforcement hacking policy. The 
President can task the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator with leading a 
 
 263. See Katyal, supra note 256, at 2317 (“[T]he Founders assumed that massive changes to the 
status quo required legislative enactments, not executive decrees.”). As Eskridge has 
noted, “[s]uch usurpation, even for the best of reasons, is inconsistent with the 
democratic premises of Article I, Section 7: major policy decisions need to pass through 
both chambers of Congress and, usually, the President before they become the law of 
the land.” Eskridge, supra note 257, at 436. 
 264. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 23) (on file with author). 
 265. See id. (manuscript at 24-27) (discussing three forms of interagency conflict resolution 
mechanisms: resolution through negotiation, resolution through executive adjudica-
tion, and resolution through formal voting and consensus rules). 
 266. See id. (manuscript at 24) (citing examples of MOUs between agencies); see also Daphna 
Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213-14 (2015) (describing an MOU 
between the NSA and the DHS “that brings the NSA’s technical prowess to bear on 
DHS-led efforts to secure [domestic] critical infrastructure,” allowing the DHS to 
“achieve cybersecurity objectives that, as a practical matter, would otherwise be 
unobtainable”). 
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council composed of a high-ranking member of each agency.267 These 
decisionmaking frameworks maximize information, expertise, coordination, 
and the ability to make decisions in response to a rapidly shifting global 
cybersecurity terrain.  
B. Substantive Policy Preferences 
This Subpart prescribes substantive restrictions to deal with the immediate 
risks posed by cross-border network investigative techniques. It identifies 
three areas where regulation may provide solutions to the new facts of 
network investigative techniques and proposes standards that balance law 
enforcement interests against foreign policy interests. To that end, the 
following substantive policy preferences are not in and of themselves meant to 
set the normative thresholds for the use of network investigative tech-
niques.268 Rather, the restrictions are meant to provide a “baseline” from which 
the executive can craft policy decisions that balance the law enforcement 
interest in solving criminal cases against the foreign policy and national 
security interests of the United States. The overriding goal in prescribing them 
is to minimize the risks outlined in Part II.C above, leaving open the possibility 
for diplomatic overtures, without forgoing the pressing investigatory needs of 
locating criminal actors on the dark web.  
1. What hacking techniques should be authorized? 
A search warrant broadly permits investigators to “use remote access to 
search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored 
information.”269 There is no discernable limit to the range of hacking activities 
a warrant authorizes. The scope of information that may be collected from 
 
 267. This representation is meant to articulate a balance among law enforcement, national 
security, and diplomatic interests. Of course, the President can add members to this 
committee or modify their roles. For example, the process can be made more autono-
mous, in that decisions to expand the government’s cross-border hacking policies can 
be made by a two-thirds vote of the committee, which would ensure balance between 
law enforcement interests and those of foreign policy and national security. A 
requirement that the Attorney General sign off on policy changes would allow the DOJ 
to effectively veto changes that reduce law enforcement hacking capabilities below the 
baseline policy preferences described in Part III.B below. 
 268. The normative goal of these “baseline” prescriptions is thus to facilitate prospective 
policymaking by minimizing the potential harm that rank-and-file decisions can cause 
to the negotiation processes integral to soft and hard harmonization efforts, the risk of 
retaliation by other nations, and potential disclosure conflicts between law enforce-
ment and the intelligence community. Importantly, the following policy preferences 
are not meant to set a “ceiling” on government hacking powers but rather a “floor” 
from which policy can flow. 
 269. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
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foreign-located devices by law enforcement can be limited to location 
information, unless consent is provided from the host nation or custodian of 
the target device.270 Such a modification to the scope of law enforcement 
hacking power satisfies the central investigatory goal of “locating” the target 
computer while minimizing the interference with the foreign state’s 
sovereignty.271  
In most cases, country information can be deciphered from IP address 
information and then used to determine whether the investigation should 
move forward. If the investigation target is domestic, investigators can proceed 
with more intrusive means. If the target ends up being overseas, the 
investigator can initiate the existing diplomatic protocols for cross-border 
collection of digital evidence, such as the MLAT process.272 This solution 
would direct agents to make reasonable efforts to determine the location of 
digital evidence being remotely collected and to proceed using diplomatic 
protocols in the event it becomes known during the course of a search that the 
data are located overseas. It complies with the DOJ’s current implementation 
guidelines and is therefore predictable.273  
 
 270. This rule would comply with norms set by the Budapest Convention. See Budapest 
Convention, supra note 217, art. 32 (permitting cross-border access to stored computer 
data if the data are publicly available or if law enforcement has first obtained consent 
from the owner of the device). This rule would also comply with U.S. electronic 
surveillance laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2015); United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 
49 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting the recording of a conversation between A defendant and 
a government informant, provided the government obtains the informant’s consent 
and cooperation); Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that 
the collection of e-mails and text messages is permitted with consent).  
 271. Collection of publicly available port information does not infringe international law. 
See Budapest Convention, supra note 217, art. 32. Moreover, a solution that only returns 
country information is of sufficiently low intensity that proportionate responses by 
injured states are unlikely to be prohibitive. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying 
text. 
 272. See supra Part I.B. 
 273. See ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS WORKING GRP., supra note 160, at 64 (“[A]gents should 
always make reasonable efforts to find out where the relevant electronic records are 
stored. If they learn before or during the search that the information may be stored in 
servers outside the United States, they must proceed as they would to obtain physical 
evidence located outside the U.S. If agents later discover they have inadvertently 
downloaded information from servers located abroad, they should seek immediate 
guidance from those authorities within their agencies who handle obtaining evidence 
from foreign nations.”). 
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2. Who should be targeted?  
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow investigators to search and 
seize the property of nonsuspects.274 International law, on the other hand, 
requires a proper prescriptive basis—some nexus between the search target and 
the harmful local effects that spawned the investigation in the first place—
before a state may exercise any form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.275  
Operationally, the use of network investigative techniques risks hacking 
foreign-located computers that belong to innocent people. One potential 
baseline policy preference that strikes the balance is to require investigators to 
make a showing of target culpability—for example, that the target device is 
owned or controlled by a criminal suspect or a fugitive.276 Another way to 
strike this balance is to limit the use of cross-border network investigative 
techniques to the collection of items whose mere possession violates U.S. 
law.277 These limiting principles minimize the situations where the United 
States asserts jurisdiction over a foreign-located noncitizen who has not caused 
effects in the United States, thus making cross-border network investigative 
techniques more defensible to the international community. 
3. What crimes should trigger use of hacking techniques? 
Another factor that will likely affect how states react to encroachments on 
their sovereignty that result from cross-border network investigative 
techniques is the seriousness of the crime being investigated. As noted, 
international norms in cyberspace are in development and likely to emerge as a 
result of state practice. The DOJ has made it clear that it intends to use hacking 
techniques for all crimes, regardless of the potential cross-border implica-
tions.278 
 
 274. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (providing that a warrant may issue for “evidence of a crime,” 
“contraband . . . or other items illegally possessed,” or “property designed for use, 
intended for use, or used in committing a crime”). 
 275. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (describing the effects test for prescriptive 
jurisdiction). 
 276. Cf. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96 (2006) (“Anticipatory warrants are, 
therefore, no different in principle from ordinary warrants. They require the 
magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a 
crime, or a fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed.”). 
 277. Network investigative techniques that infect computers that visit a particular child 
pornography server are particularly effective in sting operations because anyone who 
knowingly accesses the server is committing a crime. See Memorandum from Jonathan 
J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Judge John F. Keenan, Chair, Subcommittee on Rule 41, Advisory Comm. on Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (Jan. 17, 2014), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, supra 
note 25, at 179, 180, 205-06. 
 278. See id. 
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 The DOJ’s position would make it defensible for foreign law enforcement 
actors to hack computers in the United States as long as those actors are in 
investigatory pursuit of a violation of that foreign nation’s criminal laws. This 
is a policy decision that should benefit from the experience and expertise of 
other agencies and consideration of U.S. foreign relations and national security 
implications. 
There are several ways to reduce the scope of crimes that trigger the use of 
hacking techniques. One baseline policy preference might limit the use of 
network investigative techniques to counterterrorism investigations, for 
which—at least under the United States’ interpretation of international law—
extraterritorial enforcement is grounded in conceptions of self-defense.279  
Another limiting principle that would likely be defensible with U.S. allies 
in the international community is one that tailors the use of network 
investigative techniques to the pursuit of crimes whose seriousness is broadly 
acknowledged by states, such as terrorism, child pornography offenses, drug 
crimes, and organized cybercrime.280 Indeed, there is a history of coordination 
among the Group of Eight (G8) countries with regard to regulating these 
crimes.281 For these reasons, cross-border action limited to a small set of crimes 
considered especially heinous will be perceived as more reasonable than an 
open-ended solution and thus may be more likely to receive the support of the 
international community.282 This solution will cause minimal friction with 
allies, and it is therefore more likely to keep diplomatic channels open.283 
 
 279. The legality of such actions is not always certain. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing 
of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 171, 191-97 (2005) (arguing that in international armed conflicts suspected 
terrorists are not combatants, though in noninternational armed conflicts they may 
well be combatants, and arguing that the applicable system should incorporate features 
of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law). 
 280. See Bert-Jaap Koops & Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the Cloud, and Cross-Border Criminal 
Investigation: The Limits and Possibilities of International Law 74 (Tilburg Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, No. 05/2016, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698263. 
 281. See Goldsmith, supra note 185, at 147 (“The G8 economic powers have recently begun to 
coordinate regulatory efforts concerning Internet-related crimes in five areas: 
paedophilia and sexual exploitation; drug-trafficking; money laundering; electronic 
fraud, such as theft of credit-card numbers, and computerized piracy; and industrial 
and state espionage.”). 
 282. See id. at 147-48 (suggesting that there will be more cross-border coordination of 
regulatory efforts in areas where national interests converge). 
 283. An even less risk-averse approach may allow the use of cross-border network 
investigative techniques to be triggered by all crimes with extraterritorial application, 
satisfying the requirements of prescriptive jurisdiction though still subjecting the 
United States to some level of risk. One advantage of the executive branch promulgat-
ing these policy preferences is the ability to create and change policy on the fly. See 
supra note 256. This facilitates a law enforcement policy that is in tune with foreign 
relations policies on cyberspace, which are largely set by the executive.  
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C. Implementation and Enforcement 
Having selected the institutional actors that should set substantive cross-
border hacking policy preferences for law enforcement moving forward, this 
Subpart turns to the implementation and enforcement of those policies. The 
existing disparity between DOJ policy and practice suggests a breakdown in 
implementation and enforcement.284 This inconsistency “undermines the 
predictability of law and reverses assumptions upon which private industry 
and the public sector have reasonably relied.”285 
The judiciary is the traditional regulating institution for criminal proce-
dure.286 Its neutrality and detachment make it suitable to make the inferences 
required to grant or deny a warrant287 in light of the obvious conflict of 
interest presented by law enforcement’s focus on the “often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”288 Ex ante judicial review helps prevent 
investigators from ignoring or misinterpreting the established legal limits on 
their authority.289 Ex post judicial review provides additional checks that 
incorporate the adversarial process. However, the courts are constrained in 
their authority to regulate cross-border aspects of network investigative 
techniques because of warrant authority’s territoriality, the compulsion to 
defer to law enforcement, and judicial deference to the executive in the realm 
of foreign policy.290 This leaves Congress as the primary interbranch check on 
the foreign relations implications of law enforcement hacking. 
Congress can influence the legal process in a number of ways without 
legislating substantively. First, Congress could legislate procedural 
 
 284. See Katyal, supra note 256, at 2318. Jonathan Mayer notes the following implementa-
tion problems with network investigative techniques: (1) “[d]escriptions of malware are 
often ambiguous and misleading,” (2) investigators sometimes “assert[] that no warrant 
is required at all,” (3) malware may be delivered to innocent users, (4) “[w]arrant 
applications [may] ignore . . . the unambiguous[] time limits of Rule 41,” and (5) “the 
government [may] not properly appl[y] for a super-warrant in scenarios where they 
are unambiguously required.” Jonathan Mayer, Constitutional Malware 75 (Nov. 15, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2633247. 
 285. See Eskridge, supra note 257, at 436. 
 286. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. The structure of the Fourth Amendment recognizes the intransigence of this 
conflict by requiring a neutral disinterested arbiter to make the determination of what 
is a search and whether the executive has shown probable cause of a crime sufficient to 
overcome the constitutional privacy interest of the target. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. 
 289. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 97 (1968) (“Judicial review of the decision to intercept wire or 
oral communications will not only tend to insure that the decision is proper, but it will 
also tend to assure the community that the decision is fair.”). 
 290. See supra notes 247-51. 
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mechanisms that encourage predictable, objective application of government 
hacking policies and clear and accountable lines of command within the 
executive branch. For example, Congress could enact a statutory requirement 
that any warrant application for the use of network investigative techniques 
on the dark web must be authorized by the U.S. Attorney General or another 
designated high-ranking official.291 Limiting the government actors who may 
authorize the application for a hacking warrant “centralizes in a publicly 
responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of law 
enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance techniques.”292 Having 
high-ranking officials sign off on individual warrants increases the 
concentration of information and expertise in the decisionmaking process293 
and incentivizes applications only where the circumstances justify them.294 
Such a requirement would avoid the development of divergent practices across 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices while providing “lines of responsibility . . . to an 
identifiable person” in the event of abuse.295 Additionally, by forcing the 
agency to absorb some of the costs of violating policy, this solution would 
incentivize restraint in execution.296 Congress could also require certifications 
 
 291. This requirement would mirror that for applications seeking an order to intercept 
wire or oral communications, which requires that “[t]he Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any 
acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General or acting 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division or National Security 
Division specially designated by the Attorney General” authorize the filing of the 
application. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2015) (footnote omitted). 
 292. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 97; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (permitting any federal law 
enforcement officer or attorney for the government to apply for a search warrant). 
 293. See Joseph Lynch, Justice Department Procedures for Approval of Wiretapping and 
Eavesdropping Orders, CRIM. DEF., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 11, 11 (providing a description of 
internal review procedures for the Wiretap Act). The Wiretap Act was first passed as 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Wiretapping 
and Electronic Surveillance, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). In 1986, Congress amended the Wiretap Act to extend 
telephone wiretap restrictions to computer data transmissions. See Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). 
 294. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974) (noting in the context of the 
Wiretap Act that Congress “evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the 
statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant 
the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications”). The DOJ’s commen-
tary has rejected any limitations on the scope or manner of execution. See Memoran-
dum from David Bitkower to Judge Reena Raggi, supra note 155, at 3 (arguing against 
restrictions on remote search authority). 
 295. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 97 (“This provision in itself should go a long way toward 
guaranteeing that no abuses will happen.”).  
 296. See generally Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the 
Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021 (2004) (explaining and defending cost-benefit analysis in 
regulatory decisionmaking). 
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to satisfy the judge that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous.”297 This leverages DOJ expertise in situations where the courts lack 
appropriate technological expertise to assess whether the target’s location has 
indeed been obscured by technological means.298  
Second, Congress could exercise oversight powers on federal law enforce-
ment’s use of network investigative techniques. Congressional oversight can be 
implemented through legislative hearings by a standing congressional 
committee, such as the House Judiciary Committee or the House Intelligence 
Committee. To bolster the effectiveness of the oversight process, Congress 
should work to “equaliz[e] its access to sensitive information that otherwise lies 
solely within the Executive’s control” and build centralized technology and 
foreign affairs expertise within Congress to better analyze that information.299 
This can be done by passing legislation imposing reporting requirements on 
the scope and nature of permitted hacking techniques, their frequency of use, 
and instances where foreign-located computers are affected. Hearings should be 
open to the public to the extent possible, limiting closed sessions to cases where 
information that is classified or related to an ongoing investigation must be 
shared with members.  
Third, Congress could indirectly regulate the nature and scope of hacking 
techniques used by investigators through its authority over financial and 
budgetary matters. Malware is expensive, with prices rising as high as 
$500,000.300 By adjusting budget allocations, for example, Congress could 
indirectly control law enforcement’s procurement of malware tools through 
line item adjustments or by barring the use of funds to procure tools that do 
not comply with the vulnerability equities process.  
Fourth, Congress can allocate resources to bolster the judiciary’s techno-
logical expertise. The courts will continue to play a key role in regulating 
network investigative techniques by interpreting and applying constitutional 
and statutory checks and balances. These functions require, at minimum, an 
understanding of how the network investigative technique under scrutiny 
 
 297. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (requiring such certifications before approving a telephone 
warrant request). In commentary, the DOJ has rejected such a “necessity requirement.” 
See Memorandum from David Bitkower to Judge Reena Raggi, supra note 155, at 3. 
 298. Cf. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 31, at 6-7 (describing various instances when 
a target’s location may be obscured but not in a manner that stifles the use of current 
investigative techniques). 
 299. Koh, supra note 249, at 1327.  
 300. See Greenberg, supra note 172; see also Brian Fung, The NSA Hacks Other Countries by 
Buying Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Computer Vulnerabilities, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2013), 
https://wpo.st/Qb2e2 (explaining that in 2013 the NSA allocated more than $25 
million to purchase malware from private parties).  
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works. This, in turn, requires a level of technological expertise. To that end, 
technology training and access to expert assistance when necessary is critical to 
ensure that judges can ask the right questions and spot irregularities. 
Fifth, Congress could legislate mechanisms that encourage adversarial 
challenges to the legality of network investigative techniques. One way to do 
this through the courts is to enact an evidentiary suppression sanction for 
violations in the application or execution of network investigative 
techniques.301 This would enable a criminal defendant to challenge the use of 
evidence obtained from unlawful hacking.302 Statutory suppression also 
incentivizes restraint in execution by making law enforcement absorb the cost 
of a violation.303 This also invites outside scrutiny of network investigative 
techniques, which can add valuable technical expertise to the public debate.304 
By ensuring that other institutions and the public have ample opportunities to 
review the use of this powerful tool, society can ensure that law enforcement 
has clear incentives to exercise reasonable care when using network 
investigative techniques.305 
Conclusion 
Law enforcement’s use of hacking techniques to pursue criminal suspects 
on the dark web will result in overseas cyberexfiltration operations that may 
violate the sovereignty of other nations. The risks associated with such 
techniques are enormous: disability of U.S. foreign relations, exposure of the 
United States and its citizens to countermeasures, and exposure of the 
 
 301. Statutory suppression of evidence applies in other surveillance contexts. See 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2518(10)(a) (providing statutory suppression for persons aggrieved by a violation of 
the Wiretap Act); cf. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the 
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 63 (2004) (“[O]nline surveillance, including dynamic 
content interceptions, lack[s] the statutory suppression remedy that Congress provided 
for traditional surveillance in the Wiretap Act. . . . The omission is not aligned with a 
major goal of the [Electronic Communications Privacy Act]—to ensure the privacy of 
electronic communications and extend all of the Wiretap Act’s protections to the new 
media.”). 
 302. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 96 (1968) (noting that in the wiretapping context, “[s]uch a 
suppression rule is necessary and proper to protect privacy”). A standard that matches 
the Wiretap Act would allow any aggrieved person—not just those whose devices were 
breached—to challenge the legality of such evidence, so long as it is being used against 
her in a trial, hearing, or any other legal proceeding. 
 303. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 304. One example of outside scrutiny is challenges by technical experts in criminal cases. 
 305. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would 
Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (2003) (explaining that wiretaps 
are subject to more oversight than compelled disclosure of digital evidence under the 
SCA because the latter lacks a statutory suppression remedy). 
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investigators performing overseas searches and seizures to prosecution by 
foreign nations. These circumstances highlight the failures of the existing rules 
of criminal procedure as applied to the new facts of cross-border network 
investigative techniques. And they call into question the wisdom of 
authorizing rank-and-file officials to make enforcement decisions that 
reverberate globally without any meaningful interagency coordination or 
interbranch checks and balances. 
Criminal procedure must evolve to balance the use of network investiga-
tive techniques against countervailing foreign relations interests that may be 
harmed by unlawful foreign searches. This will require adjustments to the legal 
process that minimize the risk of political fallout by (1) maintaining existing 
jurisdictional norms governing the United States’ cross-border criminal 
investigations and (2) implementing structural modifications that allocate 
critical foreign policy decisions to the government institutions best suited to 
make them. Only then can network investigative techniques be implemented 
and enforced in a way that is predictable, legitimate, and in the public interest. 
